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
IPPR 25 YEARS OF INSIGHT, DEBATE & IMPACT

NOVEMBER 2026

BRIEFING PAPER

Oil & Gas Readiness Index

Before the First Barrel



NAMIBIA OIL AND GAS GOVERNANCE READINESS INDEX

Governance Readiness Scorecard

How prepared is Namibia to govern its emerging petroleum industry?



Overall finding

Partial readiness.

Namibia has important foundations, but significant gaps remain before it is fully prepared for commercial production.

Readiness by governance area (out of 5)

Legal and regulatory frameworks	3.27
Institutional capacity	2.29
Licensing transparency and contract governance	2.40
Revenue management and fiscal accountability	2.22
Environmental and social safeguards	2.53
Local content and economic inclusion	2.10
Public oversight, participation and transparency	2.11
Corruption prevention and integrity	2.00

Key strengths

- A functioning legal and regulatory framework for petroleum development
- A defined petroleum taxation regime and public financial management system
- Environmental assessment requirements with provision for public consultation
- Existing oversight institutions, including Parliament, the Auditor-General and Anti-Corruption Commission
- Progress on a national upstream petroleum local content policy

Main weaknesses

- Limited transparency in licensing, contracting and beneficial ownership
- Insufficient corruption prevention and conflict-of-interest safeguards
- Uncertainty over institutional mandates and implementation capacity
- Gaps in petroleum revenue management and fiscal risk oversight
- Local content policy not yet fully operational or enforceable
- Environmental monitoring, spill preparedness and decommissioning arrangements need strengthening
- Limited public access to information and opportunities for participation

Priority actions before commercial production

1. Strengthen transparency (licences, contracts, beneficial ownership, payments)
2. Clarify and resource institutional mandates and regulatory capacity
3. Establish stronger rules for revenue management, savings and public liabilities
4. Introduce robust, petroleum-specific anti-corruption measures
5. Implement and enforce the local content policy with clear targets and reporting
6. Improve environmental oversight, monitoring and offshore spill-response readiness

BY TIA-ZIA //GAROES, MARTHA NANGOLO, AND ROSEVITHA NDUMBU

INTRODUCTION

Namibia stands at a critical point in the development of its oil and gas industry. Major offshore discoveries have raised expectations of substantial investment, government revenue, employment and wider economic opportunities. If commercially developed, these resources could make an important contribution to Namibia's economic future. However, the benefits are not guaranteed. Much will depend on the quality of the institutions, laws and accountability systems established before large-scale production begins.

The experience of resource-rich countries elsewhere demonstrates that petroleum wealth can support long-term development, but it can also create opportunities for corruption, mismanagement, environmental damage and the concentration of economic benefits among a relatively small number of people. Strong governance is therefore not simply a desirable addition to petroleum development. It is essential to ensuring that Namibia's natural resources are managed transparently, responsibly and in the public interest.

Namibia is not starting from scratch. The country has an established legal framework for petroleum exploration and production, institutions responsible for licensing and regulation, a petroleum taxation system, environmental legislation and mechanisms for public financial oversight. Important reforms are also under consideration, while new policies seek to increase Namibian participation in the industry.

Nevertheless, the transition from exploration to commercial production will place substantially greater demands on these arrangements. Government will need to regulate technically complex offshore operations, negotiate and oversee major investments, manage potentially volatile revenues, protect the marine environment and ensure that economic opportunities extend beyond a limited number of companies and individuals. At the same time, citizens must be able to access information, scrutinise decisions and hold public institutions accountable

The Namibia Oil and Gas Governance Readiness Index seeks to answer this question through an assessment of eight key dimensions of petroleum governance: legal and regulatory frameworks; institutional capacity; licensing transparency and contract governance; revenue management and fiscal accountability; environmental and social safeguards; local content and economic inclusion; public oversight, participation and transparency; and corruption prevention and integrity.

Each dimension is assessed through a series of indicators scored on a five-point scale, drawing on legislation, policies, institutional arrangements and publicly available evidence of implementation. The Index distinguishes between the existence of legal or policy commitments and evidence that these commitments are being implemented effectively. It also recognises that the absence of publicly available evidence does not necessarily mean that an institution has failed to act, although a lack of disclosure is itself a governance concern where transparency is required.

The assessment reflects publicly available evidence reviewed up to 31 October 2026. It provides a baseline against which progress can be measured as Namibia moves towards commercial petroleum production.
The purpose is not simply to identify weaknesses. It is to highlight existing strengths, identify reforms that deserve priority and encourage informed public debate about how Namibia can manage its petroleum resources in the interests of present and future generations.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


How ready is Namibia to govern its emerging petroleum industry?

Namibia has established important foundations for petroleum governance, but significant gaps remain in its preparedness for commercial oil and gas production.

The findings of the *Oil and Gas Governance Readiness Index* suggest that Namibia is better prepared in terms of its basic legal and regulatory framework than in the institutional, transparency and accountability arrangements needed to implement that framework effectively.

The country has laws governing petroleum exploration and production, taxation, environmental assessment and public financial management. It also has established institutions responsible for petroleum administration, oversight and enforcement. These provide a starting point for the development of a producing petroleum industry.

However, readiness for commercial production requires more than legislation and institutional mandates. It depends on the ability to enforce regulations, manage substantial public revenues, prevent corruption, respond to



environmental emergencies, ensure meaningful local participation and provide citizens with reliable information about how the sector is governed.

Across the eight dimensions assessed, the results point to uneven readiness. The strongest scores relate to the existence of legal and regulatory frameworks, while the weaker areas concern corruption prevention, local content, public oversight, revenue management and institutional capacity.

The overall picture is therefore one of partial readiness. Namibia has many of the essential building blocks in place, but considerable work is required to turn these into an effective, transparent and accountable governance system.

Importantly, the period before commercial production provides an opportunity to address these weaknesses before petroleum revenues and associated financial and political pressures become substantially greater.

Where are the strongest elements of the governance framework?

The Index identifies several areas where Namibia has established important foundations.

Legal and regulatory frameworks: Namibia has a functioning statutory framework governing petroleum exploration, licensing, production, taxation and environmental obligations. Although parts of this framework require modernisation, the existence of established laws and procedures provides a basis for further reform.

Petroleum taxation and public financial management: The country has a defined petroleum fiscal regime and constitutional arrangements governing public revenue, parliamentary appropriation and oversight audits. These provide mechanisms through which future petroleum income can be collected and subjected to public oversight.

Environmental assessment requirements: Existing environmental legislation requires assessments and clearance for relevant petroleum activities, while providing opportunities for public consultation. These arrangements establish important safeguards, even though monitoring, enforcement and emergency-response capacity require strengthening.

Existing oversight institutions: Parliament, the Auditor-General, the Anti-Corruption Commission, the courts and other public institutions have mandates relevant to petroleum governance. There is evidence that some of these institutions have scrutinised petroleum-related decisions and activities.

Policy development: The approval of a national upstream petroleum local content policy represents progress towards establishing clearer expectations for employment, procurement, skills development and Namibian participation.

These strengths demonstrate that Namibia is not approaching petroleum development without governance foundations. The challenge is to strengthen their effectiveness, improve coordination and ensure that formal commitments produce measurable results.

Where are the most serious weaknesses?

The assessment identifies several areas of concern that could undermine Namibia's ability to manage a large-scale petroleum industry in the public interest.

1. Insufficient transparency in licensing and contracting. Although some petroleum information is publicly available, disclosure remains fragmented. Signed petroleum agreements, material amendments, licensing decisions and beneficial ownership information are not consistently accessible in a form that allows public scrutiny. This limits the ability of citizens and oversight institutions to understand who benefits from petroleum rights and on what terms.

2. Weaknesses in corruption prevention and integrity safeguards. Namibia has general anti-corruption legislation and institutions, but the evidence does not demonstrate a comprehensive set of petroleum-specific safeguards addressing conflicts of interest, politically exposed persons, beneficial ownership, preferential treatment and improper influence over high-value decisions. These risks are particularly important in a sector involving valuable licences, major contracts and substantial government discretion.

3. Uncertainty over institutional responsibilities and capacity. The proposed restructuring of upstream petroleum governance, including the role of the Upstream Petroleum Unit, creates a need for clear legal mandates, accountability arrangements and coordination between institutions. Regulatory independence, technical expertise, adequate funding and effective enforcement will become increasingly important as the industry develops.

4. Gaps in petroleum revenue management and fiscal accountability. Namibia has an established fiscal framework, but the assessment identifies weaknesses in arrangements for public disclosure of petroleum payments, management of state participation and contingent liabilities, petroleum-backed borrowing, and the governance of future petroleum savings. Without stronger safeguards, future revenues could expose the country to fiscal instability, excessive borrowing or poorly scrutinised financial commitments.

5. Limited implementation readiness for local content. The approval of a national local content policy is an important step, but its effectiveness will depend on enforceable requirements, clear institutional responsibilities, transparent procurement, measurable targets and public reporting. There is a risk that local content could benefit a narrow group of intermediaries rather than generate sustainable employment, competitive Namibian businesses and long-term skills development.

6. Environmental and social protection gaps. Environmental assessment procedures are established, but questions remain about offshore oil-spill preparedness, monitoring and enforcement, cumulative environmental impacts, community participation and financial provision for decommissioning. These weaknesses could become more consequential as petroleum activities move from exploration towards production.

7. Limited public access to information and participation. Public scrutiny is constrained by incomplete disclosure, uneven access to official information and limited opportunities for sustained participation in petroleum policy and governance. The delayed operationalisation of the Access to Information Act is an important outstanding issue.

Taken together, these weaknesses suggest that the central governance challenge is not simply the absence of laws or institutions, but the gap between formal commitments and effective implementation, public transparency and accountability.

Priority Recommendations: Strengthening Governance Before First Oil

The *Oil and Gas Governance Readiness Index* identifies eight priority reforms to strengthen Namibia's preparedness for commercial petroleum production.


1. Make petroleum licensing and contracting more transparent.
Introduce clear, rules-based licensing procedures with published evaluation criteria and reasons for decisions. Require the publication of signed petroleum agreements, material amendments and the ultimate beneficial owners of licence holders and major contractors.

2. Strengthen anti-corruption safeguards and prevent conflicts of interest.
Require disclosure of politically exposed persons (PEPs) and their interests in petroleum licences, contracts and related transactions. Introduce stronger conflict-of-interest controls, independent verification of beneficial ownership, transparent asset declarations for key decision-makers and effective whistleblower protection.

3. Clarify institutional responsibilities and strengthen regulatory capacity.
Establish clear statutory mandates and accountability arrangements for institutions responsible for petroleum governance, particularly the Upstream Petroleum Unit. Ensure that regulators have the technical expertise, financial resources and operational independence needed to oversee a complex offshore industry.

4. Establish robust safeguards for petroleum revenues and public finances.
Introduce transparent rules for managing, saving and spending petroleum revenues, including independent oversight of the sovereign wealth fund. Require public disclosure and parliamentary scrutiny of petroleum-backed borrowing, guarantees, state participation costs and contingent liabilities.

5. Ensure that petroleum development creates lasting benefits for Namibians.
Translate the approved local content policy into enforceable requirements, measurable targets and transparent reporting on employment, procurement, training and supplier development. Develop a national gas master plan to guide domestic gas utilisation, infrastructure investment, industrial development and the management of flaring and methane emissions.



6. Strengthen environmental protection and offshore emergency preparedness.
Undertake a strategic assessment of the cumulative environmental and social impacts of petroleum development, particularly on fisheries and coastal livelihoods. Improve offshore oil-spill response capacity, independent environmental monitoring and compensation arrangements. Require adequate financial security for rehabilitation and decommissioning from the early stages of petroleum operations.

7. Expand public access to information and independent oversight.
Bring the Access to Information Act into operation and establish a comprehensive public petroleum information portal. Strengthen parliamentary scrutiny, publish audit findings and ensure that communities, civil society and other stakeholders have meaningful opportunities to participate in petroleum governance. Namibia should also join the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) to strengthen transparency in the upstream petroleum sector through the systematic public disclosure of key industry information and the establishment of multi-stakeholder oversight involving government, industry and civil society.

8. Strengthen legal certainty and dispute-resolution mechanisms.
Review Namibia's international arbitration commitments and strengthen domestic arrangements for recognising and enforcing arbitral awards. Ensure that petroleum-related disputes can be resolved through clear, fair and predictable procedures that protect both the public interest and legitimate investor rights.
These reforms should be treated as priorities for the period before commercial production, rather than postponed until substantial petroleum revenues begin to flow. Establishing effective safeguards early will reduce the risks of corruption, fiscal mismanagement, environmental harm and unequal distribution of benefits, while strengthening public confidence in the governance of Namibia's petroleum resources.

Methodological Note

Scoring scale

- **1 – Significant deficiencies:** Requirements largely unmet.
- **2 – Partially met:** Some requirements fulfilled, but substantial gaps remain.
- **3 – Moderately met:** Several requirements met, but important gaps remain.
- **4 – Largely met:** Most requirements met, with relatively minor gaps.
- **5 – Fully met:** All requirements fulfilled.

Scores are based on an assessment of the legal framework and publicly available evidence of implementation. The absence of publicly available information does not necessarily mean that a process or safeguard is not in place. However, where public disclosure is itself being assessed, the absence of such information is directly relevant to the score.


Draft policies, proposed legislation and institutional arrangements that are not yet legally operational are not treated as binding or fully implemented.

Note: The scores are provisional and subject to verification against final approved policies, gazetted legislation, updated budget and debt documents, petroleum agreements, audit reports and other relevant official records. The assessment is based on publicly available evidence reviewed up to **31 October 2026**.

CATEGORY 1: LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS

Objective: Assess whether Namibia has an effective legal framework governing petroleum activity

Indicator	Description	Score / relevance	Scoring justification
1.1 Comprehensive Petroleum Legislation	Does Namibia have laws governing exploration, production, licensing, petroleum taxation/royalties, pollution prevention and decommissioning?	4/5	Namibia has a recognisable statutory framework covering upstream licences, petroleum agreements, royalties, petroleum income tax/additional profits tax, environmental clearance and decommissioning-related duties. The score is below 5 because the principal Petroleum Act dates from 1991, key rules are distributed across several instruments, and a major amendment to institutional arrangements has been proposed and is still pending.
1.2 Effectiveness of Petroleum Legislation	Are the laws current, internally coherent, enforceable and fit for deep-water discoveries, field development, decommissioning, modern transparency and a future producing sector?	3/5	Core rules are in force and have supported licensing and exploration. Nevertheless, the 1991 framework is under review and the 2025/26 reform process itself signals a need to update regulatory powers and institutional design. Publicly available evidence does not establish that all contemporary issues, especially transparent governance, local-content enforcement and fiscal stability for large discoveries are comprehensively addressed.
1.3 Licensing Framework	Are licence types, eligibility, decision-making, terms, renewals, obligations and routes to production defined in law and administered transparently?	4/5	The Petroleum Act provides for reconnaissance, exploration and production licenses, with petroleum agreements and published legal terms. Public notices have explained the closure of new application windows during administrative review. A 5 is not justified because current reform, the closed application window and limited public evidence of fully transparent, criteria-based decision records constrain the assessment of openness and predictability.
1.4 Contract Disclosure Requirements	Is there a binding rule requiring petroleum agreements, material amendments, fiscal terms and related awards to be proactively published, subject to narrow lawful redactions?	2/5	Government and NAMCOR publish model agreements and summaries of legal/fiscal terms, which improves access to baseline information. There is no comprehensive, enforceable obligation to publish every signed petroleum contract and amendment in full. Model terms or summaries are not equivalent to routine publication of executed agreements.
1.5 Beneficial Ownership Disclosure	Are companies required to disclose natural persons who ultimately own/control them, and are filings verified and accessible for petroleum licensing and procurement checks?	4/5	Namibia has a beneficial-ownership filing regime administered by BIPA under the Financial Intelligence Act framework. BIPA states that companies and close corporations must submit up-to-date beneficial ownership information at registration, after material changes and annually. The score is not 5 because the reviewed public information does not establish routine public access, petroleum-specific publication, or the effectiveness of verification and enforcement across all licence holders and contractors.



1.6 Fiscal Stability Framework	Are royalties, petroleum income tax, additional profits tax, deductions and any stabilisation terms clear, predictable, transparent and suitable for large offshore developments?	3/5	A statutory fiscal architecture exists through the Petroleum Act and Petroleum (Taxation) Act, including petroleum income tax and additional profits tax. However, recent sector reporting identifies fiscal stability and modernisation as issues under review. The score reflects a defined base regime but insufficient evidence that all terms and potential negotiated variations are transparently consolidated and demonstrably fit for emerging commercial developments.
1.7 Environmental Legal Provisions	Do petroleum rules require environmental assessment, clearance, pollution prevention, emergency preparedness, decommissioning and financial provision, including for offshore operations?	4/5	The Environmental Management Act 2007 and EIA Regulations require environmental clearance for listed activities, including petroleum exploration/production. The Petroleum Act also contains environmental, pollution-prevention and decommissioning-related obligations. The score remains below 5 because legal provisions alone do not demonstrate adequate cumulative-impact assessment, offshore response capability, enforcement capacity or long-term financial security in practice.
1.8 Local Content Legislation	Are enforceable petroleum-specific obligations in place for local employment, procurement, supplier development, training, reporting, targets and consequences for non-compliance?	2/5	Cabinet approved a National Upstream Petroleum Local Content Policy on 4 August 2026, and the UPU has been described as the policy's coordinator and monitor. This is a significant step beyond the March 2025 draft. However, an approved policy is not the same as a petroleum-specific statute.
1.9 Dispute Resolution Mechanisms	Are disputes concerning licences, petroleum agreements, land access, taxation, environment and commercial operations subject to clear judicial, administrative or arbitration pathways?	4/5	Namibia has general courts, contractual dispute-resolution mechanisms and a Petroleum Ancillary Rights Commission framework for certain landowner/licence disputes. Petroleum agreements can also contain negotiated dispute mechanisms. A 5 is not warranted without a single publicly accessible map of all routes, consistent transparency around arbitration clauses, and evidence of their practical accessibility and timeliness.
1.10 Access to Information Provisions	Can the public obtain petroleum licence, contracts, environmental studies, revenues, inspection findings and decisions under an operative access-to-information regime?	2/5	Some petroleum information, licence maps, legal terms and environmental-clearance information is published by government bodies. However, the Access to Information Act although passed is not operationalised yet and proactive petroleum disclosure remains uneven.
1.11 Anti-Corruption Safeguards	Do general anti-corruption, financial-intelligence, procurement, audit and criminal laws apply to petroleum licensing, contracting, revenue collection and state-owned participation?	4/5	Namibia has cross-cutting safeguards, including the Anti-Corruption Act, Financial Intelligence Act, public procurement framework, company beneficial-ownership filings and public-sector accountability rules. These provide a legal baseline, but the score is not 5 because their existence does not establish effective petroleum-specific risk controls, public contract disclosure, beneficial-owner verification or consistent enforcement.

Category summary

Current position and strengths: Namibia has a recognisable statutory framework covering upstream licences, petroleum agreements, royalties, petroleum income tax and additional profits tax, environmental clearance and decommissioning duties. The strongest scores (4/5) are for comprehensive petroleum legislation, licensing, beneficial ownership filing, environmental provisions, dispute resolution and general anti-corruption safeguards.

Weaknesses and implementation gaps: The main gaps concern transparency and enforceability rather than the existence of laws. There is no binding obligation to publish signed petroleum agreements and amendments, the Access to Information Act is not yet operational, and an approved local content policy is not a petroleum-specific statute. The 1991 Petroleum Act is under review, key rules are spread across several instruments, and the major institutional amendment is still pending.

Overall score reasoning and priorities: The framework is relatively well established but needs modernisation and stronger implementation. Priorities are to enact the pending reforms, require publication of executed agreements, operationalise the Access to Information Act, and convert the local content policy into enforceable law.


Indicative category average: 3.27/5

CATEGORY 2: INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY

Objective: Assess whether institutions possess the technical and operational capacity to regulate the sector.

1. MIME = Ministry of Industries, Mines and Energy 2. NAMCOR = National Petroleum Corporation of Namibia 3. UPU = Upstream Petroleum Unit (Office of the President).

Indicator	Description	Scoring Criteria	Scoring Justification
2.1 Regulatory Independence	Independence of petroleum regulator Guiding question: Is the regulator politically and operationally independent?	MIME: 2/5 NAMCOR: 3/5 UPU: 2/5	MIME: Minister holds licensing powers and appoints the Commissioner and there is no secure tenure. NAMCOR: N/A - Scoring justification left as is: NAMCOR: No regulatory powers, but Cabinet approves the MD UPU: President appoints/removes the DG and Deputy and receives their declarations, no separate budget or board as it is operating ahead of the law.
2.2 Budgetary Capacity	Adequacy of funding Guiding question: Are institutions adequately funded?	MIME: 2/5 NAMCOR: 2/5 UPU: 2/5	MIME: Petroleum Affairs Directorate operational budget allocated N$9.6m (2025/26). NAMCOR: History of debt (reached N$3.3 billion by March 2024. Government extended a N$1.2 billion guarantee/bailout in April 2024.) UPU: N$20 million in the 2026/27 national budget, housed under the Office of the President.
2.3 Monitoring & Enforcement	Ability to monitor compliance Guiding question: Can regulators effectively enforce regulations?	MIME: 2/5 NAMCOR: N/A UPU: 2/5	MIME: Licence cancellations, suspensions, or revocations handled by ministry, but penalties are low and no inspection reports are published. NAMCOR: N/A - Powers not yet in force UPU: N/A



2.4 Inter-Agency Coordination	Coordination between state institutions Guiding question: Are institutional mandates coordinated?	MIME: 3/5 NAMCOR: 3/5 UPU: 3/5	MIME: Remains responsible for broad economic sector management, macro-industrial planning, and downstream fuel marketing but most mandates to be handed over to UPU. NAMCOR: NAMCOR's reporting line has been redirected to report directly to the Presidency and its specialised oil and gas advisors under UPU draft bill. MIME. UPU: created to improve coordination and an Inter-Agency Technical Committee is proposed. Mandates are currently overlapping with Ministry during transition.
2.5 Petroleum Data Management	Systems for managing petroleum information Guiding question: Are petroleum data systems functional and secure?	MIME: 2/5 NAMCOR: 2/5 UPU: 2/5	MIME holds petroleum licence records, and section 15 provides for public inspection of the statutory register. NAMCOR holds petroleum information relevant to its commercial and technical activities. UPU: The proposed legislation requires the Unit to maintain a national petroleum data repository, which indicates an intended responsibility. However, the reviewed data does not show an operational repository, implemented security standards or a completed transfer of data responsibilities at the assessment date.

Category summary

Current position and strengths: Namibia has institutions with defined roles: MIME as licensing authority, NAMCOR as national oil company, and the UPU, created to improve coordination. Inter-agency coordination is the strongest indicator (3/5 for all three), supported by a planned Inter-Agency Technical Committee and the planned transfer of most upstream mandates to the UPU. MIME holds petroleum licence records, and section 15 provides for public inspection of the statutory register.

Weaknesses and implementation gaps: Institutional readiness is uneven and generally weak. Regulatory independence is limited as the Minister appoints the Commissioner, the President appoints the UPU's leadership, and the UPU operates ahead of its legal basis. Funding appears limited, no published inspection reports were identified, and the evidence does not establish a comprehensive online licence register, an operational data repository, or clear data responsibilities across NAMCOR, MIME and the UPU.

Overall score reasoning and priorities: Most scores sit at 2/5 because mandates, resources and systems have not yet been evidenced as in place. Priorities are to enact the UPU's statutory framework with secure tenure and dedicated funding, build regulatory capacity and enforcement, and establish a national data repository.

Indicative category average: 2.29/5

CATEGORY 3 LICENSING TRANSPARENCY AND CONTRACT GOVERNANCE

Indicator	Description	Score	Scoring justification
3.1 Fair and transparent licence allocation	Are rights allocated through a fair and transparent selection process?	2/5	The Petroleum Act sets requirements for applications, licence awards and petroleum agreements. Ministry guidance and the Minister's response explain financial-capacity assessment, while official notices identify application windows and closures. Chambers 2026 reports continued closure in mid-2026, pending July 2022–November 2024 applications, and reasons on request and judicial review rather than an appeal for refused applicants. These sources explain the procedure, but not consistently why individual applicants were selected or how competing applications were resolved. This supports 2/5.
3.2 Public licensing information	Can the public identify rights holders and licence terms?	3/5	Section 15 requires a register of licence holders, joint holders, blocks, conditions, royalty and fee obligations, and interests granted, ceded or assigned. Any person may inspect the register during ordinary office hours and make or obtain copies, on payment of the applicable fees. Published Ministry maps also help identify holders and blocks. This supports 3/5, but dated maps and scattered publications do not give the public a complete, current picture of licence terms and subsequent changes.
3.3 Contract publication	Are executed agreements and amendments publicly available?	2/5	Section 13 provides for petroleum agreements between Government and applicants. The published model terms explain the starting point for negotiations, while some signed amendments are available through SEC filings. However, these examples do not give the public access to all signed agreements and amendments. The score is 2/5 because disclosure is partial, and no general publication requirement was identified in the petroleum provisions reviewed.
3.4 Beneficial ownership transparency	Can the public trace ownership to natural persons?	2/5	The Companies Act requires beneficial ownership records and filings. Section 122A(6) allows public inspection of beneficial owners' full names and the nature and extent of their ownership. BIPA also publishes filing requirements, including for external companies. These provisions support 2/5. The remaining question is whether the public can follow the ownership of petroleum licence holders through any companies involved to the individuals who ultimately own them; the reviewed evidence does not consistently show this.

3.5 Conflict of interest safeguards	Are conflicts of interest prevented and managed when petroleum licences are assessed and awarded?	2/5	Section 6 restricts petroleum licence interests and company shareholdings of the Commissioner, Chief Inspector and other Ministry officers. It also covers certain spousal shareholdings, but does not expressly name the Minister. Public-service rules address private work, misuse of office and improper rewards. These safeguards support 2/5, but the evidence does not show how consistently licensing officials' interests are checked, conflicts recorded, affected officials excluded from decisions or breaches addressed.
3.6 Independent oversight	Are petroleum licensing decisions subject to effective scrutiny by institutions outside the licensing authority?	3/5	Licensing decisions can be scrutinised through court review, the Ombudsman and the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC). In the Red Soil litigation, the High Court reviewed the Minister's refusal of an exploration-licence application, and the Supreme Court dismissed the subsequent appeal on 4 June 2026. April 2026 reporting also records the ACC Director General confirming an investigation into a PEL 37 renewal. These examples support 3/5 because independent scrutiny has occurred, but do not establish how regularly licensing decisions are examined or whether oversight findings lead to corrective action.
3.7 Parliamentary oversight	Does Parliament scrutinise petroleum licence awards and signed petroleum agreements?	3/5	Parliament can question ministers and examine decisions through its committees. The ReconAfrica inquiry considered licensing and consultation and recommended consultation before awards. Reporting also records ministerial explanations of particular awards. This supports 3/5: Parliament has used its scrutiny powers, but the available examples do not show regular examination of complete signed petroleum agreements or sustained checks on whether recommendations are implemented.
3.8 Anti-corruption mechanisms	Are measures in place to prevent, detect and respond to corruption in petroleum licensing?	3/5	Anti-corruption laws provide offences and investigative powers, while interest restrictions address risks involving officials. The Minister reportedly described a Licensing Evaluation Committee, and the ACC Director General reportedly confirmed a PEL 37 renewal investigation. Together, these support 3/5 for prevention and an investigative response. However, they do not show consistent checks for corruption risks, committee effectiveness or corrective outcomes. An investigation does not establish wrongdoing.

3.9 Transparency of negotiations	Are negotiated agreement terms and changes documented, explained and available for public scrutiny?	2/5	Government's model petroleum agreement sets out a starting point for negotiations and identifies negotiable terms. Some published amendments show what was changed. However, the reviewed documents do not consistently explain the final terms across agreements or why Government accepted substantive changes to standard protections. This supports 2/5 for partial disclosure.
3.10 Public participation	Can affected people comment on proposed petroleum licence allocations before an award is made?	2/5	Environmental assessment allows interested and affected people to comment on proposed petroleum activities and their impacts. Section 12(1)(b) of the Petroleum Act also allows publication of application particulars, but does not require a general community-comment process before an exploration licence is awarded. Parliament's committee recommended consultation before awards. The score is 2/5 because related participation rights exist, but they do not guarantee a voice in the initial allocation decision.


Category summary

Current position and strengths: Namibia has laws governing petroleum applications and agreements, a licence register open to public inspection, and beneficial ownership filing and limited public inspection rights. Published model terms, maps and selected agreement amendments provide further information. Courts, Parliament and the ACC also provide scrutiny: licensing decisions have been challenged, a parliamentary inquiry has examined licensing, and an ACC investigation has been reported. The framework therefore offers substantive safeguards and examples of their use.

Weaknesses and implementation gaps: The main difficulty is understanding why particular applicants received licences and what terms Government ultimately agreed. Selected disclosures do not provide a complete set of contracts or consistently allow the public to trace current ownership. The evidence also leaves questions about conflict checks and follow-up on oversight findings. Environmental consultation provides a related safeguard, but does not guarantee participation before a licence is allocated. These findings concern what the reviewed law and public evidence show; they do not prove that undisclosed records or procedures are absent.

Overall score reasoning and priorities: The ten indicators give an average of **2.40/5**. Indicator 3.8 receives 3/5 because legal controls, the reported evaluation committee and an ACC investigative response show more than legal provision alone, although consistent effectiveness is not established. Priorities are publication of award reasons and agreements, clearer public ownership information, transparent management of integrity risks and participation before allocation. Missing records are treated as evidence gaps, except where public availability is itself what the indicator assesses.

Indicative category average: 2.40/5



CATEGORY 4: REVENUE MANAGEMENT AND FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY


Objective: Assess whether petroleum-related public revenues and fiscal exposures are collected, disclosed, budgeted, saved, audited and managed in a manner that protects fiscal sustainability and the interests of current and future generations.

Boundary with other categories: Category 1 assesses the existence and design of the petroleum tax and fiscal-stability framework. This category assesses revenue administration, public-finance management and fiscal-risk governance. Category 2 assesses institutional capacity; this category assesses the fiscal controls and public reporting outcomes those institutions should produce.

Category 4: Revenue Management and Fiscal Accountability

Indicator	Description	Score / relevance	Scoring justification
4.1 Petroleum revenue collection and administration	Are petroleum taxes, royalties, licence fees, bonuses and other government receipts subject to clear administration, assessment, collection and enforcement arrangements?	3/5	Namibia has a statutory petroleum fiscal regime under the Petroleum (Taxation) Act and the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act. The IMF's 2024 review concluded that the upstream fiscal regime was broadly fit for purpose, while noting that it had not yet been tested in production and recommending measures to improve clarity, simplicity and revenue protection. These are meaningful foundations. A higher score is not justified because the public evidence reviewed does not yet demonstrate a producing-sector record of petroleum revenue assessment, collection, audit and enforcement, nor a published petroleum revenue administration performance framework.
4.2 Public disclosure and reconciliation of petroleum payments	Can the public identify, by company and revenue stream, what petroleum companies pay and what government entities receive, with independent reconciliation and explanations of discrepancies?	2/5	The legal fiscal framework identifies taxes, royalties and other payments, and government budget documents provide aggregate revenue information. However, the reviewed material does not establish routine, project-level publication of payments by company and revenue stream, matched against receipts recorded by the State. Nor is there an established public reconciliation process comparable to the EITI reporting model. The score recognises that statutory accounting and budget reporting provide a base, but transparency of petroleum-specific payment and receipt flows remains partial. Namibia's non-membership of EITI is not itself proof of weak performance; the relevant issue is the absence of an equivalent, publicly evidenced reconciliation mechanism.

4.3 Integration of petroleum revenues into the national budget	Are petroleum receipts recorded through the public financial management system, appropriated by Parliament and reported as part of the national budget rather than spent through opaque extra-budgetary arrangements?	3/5	Article 125 of the Constitution provides for central government income to be paid into the State Revenue Fund, subject to lawful exceptions, and provides that withdrawals require an Act of Parliament. Article 126 requires annual revenue and expenditure estimates to be presented to the National Assembly. These are important controls. The score is 3/5 because the framework provides a route for parliamentary appropriation, but the reviewed evidence does not yet show a complete operational protocol for future petroleum receipts, including treatment of bonuses, state participation proceeds, in-kind revenues, production-sharing entitlements, or payments routed through state-owned entities. The system has not yet been tested at material petroleum-production scale
4.4 Sovereign wealth fund governance and public accountability	Is the Welwitschia Sovereign Wealth Fund governed by a clear legal mandate, transparent deposit and withdrawal rules, independent investment oversight, audited accounts and public reporting?	2/5	Drafts of a Sovereign Wealth Fund bill have been in circulation since 2022 but a final version has not been published for comment. The National Upstream Petroleum Local Content Policy draft identifies the Welwitschia Sovereign Wealth Fund as a mechanism for saving a portion of petroleum proceeds for current and future generations. This indicates a policy intention to save and invest resource revenues. However, the reviewed public evidence does not establish a complete and operational petroleum-revenue deposit and withdrawal rule, a transparent investment mandate, a published benchmark portfolio, independent oversight arrangements, or regular audited public reporting for a fully operational fund. The score is therefore 2/5: the policy direction exists, but the full governance architecture and demonstrated operation require confirmation. The Index should update this score if a constituting Act, regulations, audited statements or investment reports are published.
4.5 Debt sustainability and petroleum-related macro-fiscal risk	Are petroleum revenue forecasts and development scenarios incorporated into medium-term debt sustainability analysis, stress testing and fiscal-risk statements, including downside and delayed-production scenarios?	2/5	Namibia's fiscal strategy has recognised elevated public debt, refinancing exposure and contingent liabilities. The 2026/27 Mid-Year Budget Review projects Namibia's public debt to reach N$201.7 billion, equivalent to 68.7% of GDP, by the end of FY2026/27, highlighting mounting debt-servicing costs, refinancing pressures and continued risks to fiscal sustainability. The IMF's 2018 technical assistance report also identified explicit and implicit fiscal risks from public enterprises and public-private partnerships. These documents demonstrate awareness of debt and fiscal-risk management. The score remains 2/5 because the reviewed public material does not establish a recurring petroleum-specific fiscal-risk statement that stress-tests delayed first oil, lower prices, cost overruns, decommissioning liabilities, exchange-rate shocks and revenue volatility against the debt path.



4.6 Disclosure and control of petroleum-backed borrowing and guarantees	Are petroleum-backed loans, prepayment arrangements, resource-collateralised borrowing, guarantees and contingent liabilities prohibited or tightly controlled, disclosed to Parliament and reported in the debt and fiscal-risk statements?	1/5	The State Finance Act provides a general legal framework for state borrowing, repayment of loans and the furnishing of government guarantees and securities. That general framework is relevant, but the reviewed sources do not identify a petroleum-specific prohibition or approval-and-disclosure regime for borrowing secured against future petroleum production, petroleum revenues, state participation interests or related infrastructure. Nor was a comprehensive public register of petroleum-linked guarantees, prepayment agreements and contingent liabilities identified. This is a significant readiness gap because resource-backed borrowing can commit future revenues before they are received and may create opaque sovereign exposure. The score is 1/5 pending evidence of explicit controls and public reporting.
4.7 Fiscal transparency of state participation and national oil company exposure	Are the costs, financing, liabilities, carried interests, dividends, guarantees and commercial risks associated with state participation and NAMCOR publicly reported and independently scrutinised?	2/5	The IMF's 2024 petroleum fiscal review specifically recommended that the costs and benefits of state participation be considered and that petroleum agreements be published. The Public Enterprises Governance Act requires public enterprises to prepare annual reports containing audited financial statements and performance information and provides for those reports to be tabled in the National Assembly. This provides a formal accountability route. The score is 2/5 because the reviewed evidence does not yet demonstrate a consolidated public account of the State's petroleum participation exposure, including the financing of equity interests, carried costs, future cash calls, guarantees, debt, dividend flows and contingent liabilities. The commercial status of NAMCOR must be distinguished from its public-interest role; it is not a substitute for an independent regulator.
4.8 Independent audit of petroleum revenues and expenditure	Are petroleum-related revenues, state participation, petroleum funds and related expenditure subject to independent audit, timely publication of findings and parliamentary follow-up?	3/5	Article 127 of the Constitution establishes the Auditor-General's mandate to audit the State Revenue Fund and report annually to the National Assembly. The Auditor-General's published mandate also includes audits of extractive industries and other statutory bodies. The Public Enterprises Governance Act requires audited financial statements to be included in annual reports and those reports to be laid before Parliament. These are significant legal and institutional foundations. The score is 3/5 because petroleum production revenue streams and a fully operational sovereign wealth fund have not yet generated a sustained public audit record, and the reviewed evidence does not establish a regular petroleum-specific audit programme with published findings and tracked parliamentary implementation.

4.9 Long-term saving, stabilisation and intergenerational equity	Are rules in place to smooth volatile petroleum revenues, limit pro-cyclical spending and preserve a transparent share of resource wealth for future generations?	2/5	The policy commitment to a Welwitschia Sovereign Wealth Fund indicates recognition of intergenerational saving. The constitutional State Revenue Fund and parliamentary appropriation process provide a public-finance foundation. However, the reviewed evidence does not establish a fully operational fiscal rule defining how much petroleum revenue may be spent, saved or withdrawn, how deposits and withdrawals respond to price cycles, or how the fund interacts with the medium-term expenditure and debt frameworks. A fund name or policy commitment alone does not establish fiscal discipline. The score is 2/5 until binding rules, transparent reporting and a demonstrated record are available.

Category summary

Current position and strengths: Namibia has a constitutional basis for central revenue collection and parliamentary appropriation, a statutory petroleum tax regime, an Auditor-General with a broad audit mandate, and public-enterprise reporting requirements. The IMF's 2024 review provides an important external assessment that the upstream fiscal regime is broadly fit for purpose, while emphasising that production experience is still absent.

Weaknesses and implementation gaps: The main gap is not the absence of a tax framework; it is the lack of a complete, publicly evidenced system for petroleum-specific payment reconciliation, sovereign wealth fund rules, debt stress testing, petroleum-backed borrowing disclosure and consolidated reporting of state participation exposure. The country's existing debt and public-enterprise risks make these controls especially important before large petroleum revenues or liabilities arise.

Overall score reasoning and priorities: Adopt a petroleum fiscal transparency framework; publish company-by-company payment and government-receipt data; establish binding Welwitschia Fund deposit, withdrawal, investment and audit rules; publish petroleum-linked guarantees and contingent liabilities; require parliamentary approval and public disclosure of any resource-backed borrowing; and incorporate petroleum downside scenarios into debt sustainability and fiscal-risk statements.

Indicative category average: 2.22/5






Photo: TotalEnergies



CATEGORY 5 ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL SAFEGUARDS

Indicator	Description	Score	Scoring justification
5.1 Environmental impact assessment requirements	Are environmental and social risks assessed before listed petroleum activities proceed?	3/5	The Environmental Management Act and the 2012 instruments - GN 29 and the EIA Regulations, GN 30 - require clearance before listed activities proceed and provide for assessment and consultation. Rhino's drilling and seismic approvals show the process being applied; the 2026 seismic conditions require compliance with the approved management plan. This supports 3/5, but individual approvals cannot show whether assessment quality and implementation are consistent across petroleum activities.
5.2 Strategic environmental assessment	Are cumulative and long-term risks assessed and used in petroleum sector planning?	2/5	EMA principles and environmental-planning provisions support consideration of cumulative and long-term impacts. Parliament's committee also recommended a strategic assessment covering the full oil-development life cycle. However, the reviewed evidence does not show a completed, current petroleum-sector assessment being used to guide licence allocation, infrastructure locations and development choices. The score is 2/5: foundations exist, but their use in sector planning is not established. This does not mean that no strategic study exists.
5.3 Offshore oil spill preparedness	Can adequate resources be mobilised to respond to a major offshore spill?	2/5	Namibia has a marine pollution contingency framework, but its November 2024 report to the Global Initiative for West, Central and Southern Africa (GI WACAF) identified limited, largely obsolete government equipment, very limited Tier 2 capacity and insufficient Tier 3 national capacity. These reported resource gaps explain the 2/5 score. The report does not show what has improved since then or whether international assistance can be reliably mobilised.
5.4 Environmental monitoring and enforcement	Do authorities monitor petroleum activities and enforce environmental conditions?	2/5	The EMA gives authorities powers to inspect activities, issue compliance orders and suspend or cancel environmental clearance certificates. However, Namibia-wide research identifies monitoring and enforcement weaknesses, also discussed in the Bank of Namibia's 2026 paper. The score is 2/5 because legal powers exist alongside documented capacity concerns and limited petroleum-specific enforcement evidence. These findings do not mean that every current petroleum project is failing to comply.

5.5 Climate change integration	Are project emissions and climate risks consistently assessed and addressed in petroleum decisions?	2/5	EMA principles and national climate reporting support consideration of climate risks. Rhino's files also include climate-risk, greenhouse-gas and emissions assessments. These are useful examples, but the reviewed EMA and EIA Regulations do not expressly set a uniform petroleum-specific assessment method. Nor does the evidence show consistent use of findings in enforceable emissions and resilience conditions. The score is 2/5 because climate assessment occurs, but its consistent influence on petroleum approvals is not established.
5.6 Community consultation	Can directly affected communities participate meaningfully in environmental decisions?	3/5	The EIA Regulations require notification, registration of interested and affected parties, opportunities to comment and participation records. Petroleum project files show consultation taking place, while research and the ReconAfrica inquiry identify weaknesses. This supports 3/5 for legal rights and demonstrated procedures. However, holding a consultation does not itself show that affected groups can participate meaningfully or that their concerns shape decisions. It also does not establish community consent.
5.7 Public environmental participation	Can the wider public obtain information and contribute to environmental decisions?	3/5	The EIA Regulations provide public notice and comment procedures, and EMA section 38 allows inspection of specified decision records. Public petroleum repositories also contain assessments and consultation documents. These channels support 3/5. However, publishing documents does not show that the public can obtain information throughout the process or understand how its comments affected approval conditions. Practitioner reporting also identifies difficulties in obtaining environmental information.
5.8 Biodiversity and marine ecosystems	Are biodiversity, marine ecosystems and fisheries safeguarded in petroleum decisions?	3/5	Environmental assessment requirements, the Marine Resources Act and the Namibian Islands' Marine Protected Area regulations provide safeguards for ecosystems and fisheries. Petroleum assessments also examine marine ecology, fisheries, underwater noise and spill risks. This supports 3/5 because legal protections and assessment are in place. The reviewed evidence does not, however, show whether cumulative impacts are consistently managed or whether compliance outcomes protect sensitive habitats and fisheries.
5.9 Grievance redress	Can affected people obtain accessible and timely remedies for environmental decisions?	2/5	EMA section 50 provides an appeal to the Minister, while section 51 permits a further appeal to the High Court on points of law only; an appeal to the Minister does not automatically suspend the decision. Ncumcara's unsuccessful interim application attracted costs. ReconAfrica's filing confirms ministerial oral argument on 24 April 2023, without stating the final outcome. The score is 2/5: remedies are available, but cost exposure and limited evidence of timely outcomes leave their practical accessibility and effectiveness uncertain.



5.10 Emergency response coordination	Are authorities and operators assigned clear responsibilities and able to coordinate a joint response?	3/5	Namibia's November 2024 GI WACAF report identifies response responsibilities, government–industry cooperation, mutual assistance and annual national exercises. These support 3/5 for coordination arrangements and reported practice. However, the report identifies no procedure for temporarily borrowing industry equipment, and does not establish performance in a major incident or completed follow-up on exercises. These findings describe the position reported in November 2024.
5.11 Resettlement and compensation	Are land access, displacement and livelihood losses fairly addressed?	2/5	The Petroleum Act provides compensation for specified private-land damage and for ancillary rights. Where the Commission orders compensation for ancillary rights, payment or security is generally required before those rights are exercised, unless the Commission determines otherwise. These protections support 2/5, but compensation for particular rights or damage is not a complete resettlement or livelihood-restoration system. The reviewed petroleum evidence does not establish consistent outcomes for customary land users or affected fishing communities.
5.12 Occupational health and safety	Are petroleum worker safety duties monitored and enforced?	2/5	Petroleum safety regulations (GN 190 of 1999), the Labour Act and workplace regulations (GN 156 of 1997) protect workers. The Ministry also reports an upstream safety protocol and monthly operator health, safety and environment reports. The provisional score is 2/5 because duties and reporting exist, but published inspection findings, incident investigations and enforcement outcomes are insufficient to judge implementation reliably. This evidence gap does not establish unsafe operations.
5.13 Decommissioning and rehabilitation	Are closure and restoration duties enforceable and supported by adequate financial security?	3/5	The Petroleum Act requires production-stage decommissioning plans and trust funds, with licence holders remaining liable for shortfalls. Section 68B(1) requires fund establishment on a date determined by the Minister in writing, no earlier than the date when 50% of estimated recoverable reserves would have been produced. This supports 3/5 for legal duties and financial provision, but leaves potential exposure before funding begins. The statutory mechanism alone does not show that project security is adequate or that exploration-stage rehabilitation is funded.
5.14 Transparency of environmental reports	Can the public obtain assessments, decisions and environmental compliance information?	3/5	EMA section 38 allows inspection of specified decision records. Public repositories also contain assessments, management documents and clearance conditions. Rhino's seismic approval requires on-site document access for registered interested and affected parties. These arrangements support 3/5, but on-site access is not the same as online publication. The reviewed evidence does not establish comprehensive public access to subsequent monitoring reports, audits and enforcement outcomes.

5.15 International environmental standards	Are international environmental obligations reflected in domestic safeguards and implementation?	3/5	Article 144 of the Constitution makes international agreements binding on Namibia part of domestic law, subject to constitutional and statutory exceptions. EMA assessment provisions and section 48, marine safeguards and national climate reporting provide ways to give effect to obligations relevant to the Paris Agreement, biodiversity convention and UNCLOS. These measures support 3/5. Treaty participation and reporting alone do not show consistent application through petroleum approval conditions, monitoring and compliance.

Category summary

Current position and strengths: Namibia requires environmental clearance and assessment and provides consultation, enforcement and appeal procedures. Marine protection, worker safety and production-stage closure duties add further safeguards. Rhino's published assessments and approval conditions show practical application, including a binding approved management plan and specified document access. Official marine-pollution reports and national climate submissions provide further evidence of implementation. These examples show that the framework operates, rather than existing only on paper.


Weaknesses and implementation gaps: The remaining concern is how consistently these safeguards influence decisions and protect people and the environment. The evidence is less complete on assessment quality, meaningful participation, monitoring outcomes and the use of cumulative-impact assessment in sector planning. The November 2024 report identifies spill-response resource gaps, while decommissioning-fund timing leaves potential earlier exposure. Individual approvals cannot establish compliance across the sector. The final ECC0091 ministerial appeal outcome and the precise published management-plan version incorporated into Rhino's approval also remain unconfirmed.

Overall score reasoning and priorities: The fifteen indicators give an average of **2.53/5**. Additional project documents strengthen the evidence behind existing 3/5 ratings, but do not establish the consistent implementation needed for 4/5. The worker-safety score of 2/5 remains low confidence. Priorities are strategic and explicit climate assessment, adequate spill-response resources, meaningful participation, accessible compliance information, effective remedies and adequate closure security. Missing public records alone are not treated as proof of failure across the sector.

Indicative category average: 2.53/5



Photo: Magnific




CATEGORY 6: LOCAL CONTENT AND ECONOMIC INCLUSION

Objective: Assess whether Namibia has the policy, legal, institutional and practical arrangements to ensure that petroleum development creates sustainable opportunities for Namibian workers, businesses, entrepreneurs and communities, while building capabilities that endure beyond the life of individual projects.

Boundary with other categories: Category 1 assesses whether petroleum-specific local-content legislation exists. Category 6 assesses policy implementation readiness, measurable outcomes, supplier development, skills, inclusion and value addition. Environmental and community safeguards remain assessed in Category 5.

Indicator	Description	Score / relevance	Scoring justification
6.1 National upstream local-content policy	Has Namibia adopted a coherent policy setting out objectives and practical measures for local employment, procurement, enterprise development, technology transfer and Namibian participation?	3/5	Cabinet approved the National Upstream Petroleum Local Content Policy at its 25th meeting on 4 August 2026, as publicly reported in August 2026. The policy is an important step because it identifies employment, local procurement, enterprise development, skills and technology transfer, research and innovation, and increased Namibian participation as objectives. The score is 3/5: policy direction has been approved, but the approved instrument and its implementation arrangements need to be publicly accessible in a definitive version, and policy approval is not equivalent to a comprehensive petroleum-specific Act with enforceable duties and remedies.
6.2 Legal enforceability and clear institutional mandate	Are local-content obligations legally binding, assigned to a lawfully empowered institution and supported by clear rules, regulations and appeal mechanisms?	2/5	The approved policy assigns the Upstream Petroleum Unit (UPU) responsibilities to coordinate, implement, monitor and enforce local-content requirements, according to reporting on the policy text. However, the Petroleum Amendment Bill establishing the proposed UPU statutory framework had not been passed at the date of this assessment, and the draft policy's institutional arrangements have been publicly discussed as part of the transition. This creates a distinction between a Cabinet-approved policy direction and a regulator with fully enacted statutory powers. The score is 2/5 because institutional responsibility is identified, but the legal basis, regulations, enforcement procedures and independent review arrangements require confirmation.
6.3 Transparent access to petroleum procurement opportunities	Are procurement opportunities, prequalification criteria, tender outcomes, subcontracting arrangements and beneficial ownership of suppliers publicly disclosed in a way that allows Namibian firms to compete fairly?	2/5	The Public Procurement Act provides principles of integrity, accountability, transparency, competitive supply and value for money, and contains provisions on conflicts of interest and preferential treatment for qualifying Namibian suppliers. These provisions create a useful baseline for public procurement. Petroleum operator procurement is not necessarily identical to procurement by a public entity, however, and the reviewed evidence does not establish a comprehensive petroleum-sector portal publishing opportunities, award criteria, contract awards, subcontractors and supplier ownership. The score is 2/5 because the policy objective is clear but transparent and consistent access across operator and contractor supply chains is not yet demonstrated.

6.4 Employment targets, skills development and workforce planning	Are petroleum employers required to publish workforce plans, Namibian employment targets, training commitments, succession plans and measurable skills-transfer outcomes?	2/5	The local-content policy framework identifies employment, skills development and technology transfer as key aims. Namibia also has education and vocational training institutions that could support sector skills development. The reviewed public evidence does not establish a complete petroleum workforce baseline, enforceable occupation-specific targets, a public training levy or fund with transparent disbursements, or annual reporting on the proportion of Namibians employed at different skill levels. A policy aspiration is not sufficient to demonstrate delivery.
6.5 SME supplier development and access to finance	Are practical mechanisms available to help Namibian SMEs meet petroleum-sector standards, obtain finance, access tender information, form partnerships and graduate into competitive suppliers?	2/5	The approved policy identifies enterprise development and increased Namibian ownership and participation as intended outcomes. The Public Procurement Act also recognises SME participation and local economic empowerment in public procurement. However, the reviewed evidence does not establish a fully funded, petroleum-specific supplier-development programme with published eligibility criteria, technical assistance, supplier-readiness milestones, credit guarantees or transparent disbursement data. Given the high technical, insurance and working-capital requirements of the sector, general SME support alone may not enable local firms to enter complex supply chains.
6.6 Technology transfer, research and innovation	Do petroleum agreements and local-content arrangements contain measurable commitments for technology transfer, research collaboration, local innovation and development of Namibian technical capabilities?	2/5	Technology transfer, research and innovation are expressly identified as policy objectives in the local-content framework. These objectives are important for moving beyond low-value services and short-term employment. The reviewed evidence does not, however, establish standard contractual clauses, measurable transfer milestones, reporting requirements, intellectual-property arrangements or a public record of research partnerships and technology transfer outcomes. The score is 2/5 because the objective is recognised but enforceable and measurable delivery mechanisms are not yet sufficiently demonstrated.
6.7 Inclusive participation by women, youth and historically underserved groups	Are operators and contractors required to publish annual local-content plans and actual performance, including employment, procurement spend, ownership, training, subcontracting and compliance?	2/5	The Public Procurement Act recognises empowerment objectives, including opportunities for SMEs, women and youth, and preferential treatment for qualifying Namibian suppliers. The petroleum local-content policy also aims to increase Namibian ownership and participation. The reviewed evidence does not establish petroleum-specific targets, disaggregated reporting, transparent verification of ownership and control, or safeguards against nominal ownership arrangements that do not transfer real economic benefit. The score is 2/5: broad policy and procurement principles exist, but measurable petroleum-sector inclusion is not yet demonstrated.



6.8 Local-content transparency and public performance reporting	Are operators and contractors required to publish annual local-content plans and actual performance, including employment, procurement spend, ownership, training, subcontracting and compliance?	2/5	The policy assigns the UPU a coordination, monitoring, reporting and oversight role, according to public reporting on the policy. That is a potential platform for performance reporting. However, the reviewed evidence does not establish a standardised public reporting template, company-level publication requirements, independent verification, or an accessible public database of local-content performance. Public reporting is essential to distinguish genuine local value creation from nominal local registration or pass-through contracting. The score is 2/5 because monitoring is contemplated but transparent outcomes are not yet evidenced.
6.9 Compliance monitoring, sanctions and remedy	Can the responsible authority verify local-content claims, investigate non-compliance, impose proportionate sanctions and provide a fair review or appeal process?	2/5	The policy is reported to give the UPU a monitoring and enforcement role. The existence of a stated role is a positive development, but the proposed statutory institutional framework had not been enacted at the assessment cut-off. The reviewed evidence does not establish published inspection protocols, audit powers, sanctions schedules, complaint mechanisms, enforcement statistics or appeal procedures specific to local-content obligations. The score is 2/5 because the policy contemplates enforcement but operational readiness and an enforceable legal basis remain uncertain.
6.10 Domestic value addition and linkages to the wider economy	Does petroleum planning connect local-content measures to viable domestic processing, gas utilisation, logistics, ports, storage, engineering, energy supply and diversified industrial development?	2/5	The 2017 National Energy Policy identifies the need to develop and commercialise natural gas, integrate upstream and downstream gas development, encourage domestic petrochemical activity and attract investment in gas infrastructure. It also recognises gaps in domestic gas-market development and the absence of LNG and other gas infrastructure at the time of publication. The March 2025 local-content policy draft similarly links local participation to value addition and infrastructure. These policy foundations are useful, but the reviewed evidence does not demonstrate a fully funded and sequenced implementation plan connecting discoveries to domestic gas use, pipeline access, ports, storage, processing and wider industrial capabilities.

Category summary

Current position and strengths: Cabinet approval of the National Upstream Petroleum Local Content Policy in August 2026 is a significant policy milestone. The policy direction recognises employment, procurement, enterprise development, technology transfer and Namibian ownership. General procurement law also contains principles of integrity, transparency, local participation and inclusion.


Weaknesses and implementation gaps: The principal weaknesses concern enforceability, institutional authority, measurable targets and public reporting. The UPU's proposed role must be aligned with the enacted statutory framework. There is not yet sufficient public evidence of company-level performance data, supplier-development financing, occupation-specific training outcomes, women- and youth-owned supplier outcomes, or effective sanctions for non-compliance. Local content risks becoming a distribution of contracts rather than a long-term capability-building strategy if beneficial ownership and actual value addition are not verified.

Overall score reasoning and priorities: Publish the definitive Cabinet-approved policy and implementation plan; enact and clarify the statutory mandate; issue regulations and standard reporting templates; require annual company-level reporting; establish a transparent supplier-development and skills fund; publish procurement opportunities and awards; verify beneficial ownership and substantive local control; and link local-content plans to a national gas, infrastructure and industrialisation strategy.

Indicative category average: 2.10/5



Photo: Mining and Energy




CATEGORY 7: PUBLIC OVERSIGHT, PARTICIPATION AND TRANSPARENCY

Objective: Assess whether citizens, affected communities, civil society, media, Parliament and independent public institutions can access information, influence petroleum policy and decisions, scrutinise public revenues and hold decision-makers accountable.

Boundary with other categories: Category 3 assesses transparency and scrutiny within licensing and contract governance. Category 5 assesses environmental consultation and safeguards. Category 7 assesses the broader public accountability ecosystem, including fiscal scrutiny, access to information, participation in national policy and international transparency commitments.

Indicator	Description	Score / relevance	Scoring justification
7.1 Operational access-to-information regime	Can the public obtain petroleum-related information from public entities through an operative, enforceable access-to-information law with an independent review and appeal mechanism?	2/5	Namibia enacted the Access to Information Act 8 of 2022, which provides for access to information held by public and private entities, an Information Commissioner, request procedures and review mechanisms. NamibLII records the Act as not yet commenced at the date checked. The score is 2/5 because enactment is a substantial legal step, but an uncommenced Act does not yet provide an operational statutory access-to-information remedy. Existing voluntary publication and other statutory inspection rights remain relevant but are not a substitute for an operative regime.
7.2 Proactive publication of petroleum information	Are key petroleum documents proactively published in accessible, searchable and regularly updated formats, including licences, agreements, fiscal terms, production data, environmental reports and government receipts?	2/5	Some licence maps, model petroleum agreements, selected amendments, legal terms, environmental assessments and project approvals are publicly available. The existing Categories 2 and 3 assessments also identify gaps in the completeness and currency of public licensing, ownership and contract information. The score is 2/5 because disclosure is fragmented and does not yet amount to a single, complete and routinely updated public petroleum information system. This indicator assesses the broader information ecosystem and does not re-score the specific contract-disclosure indicator in Category 3.
7.3 Parliamentary scrutiny of petroleum policy and fiscal decisions	Does Parliament receive timely information and exercise meaningful scrutiny over petroleum policy, licence governance, major projects, revenue management, borrowing, guarantees and state participation?	3/5	The Constitution gives the National Assembly authority to consider annual revenue and expenditure estimates and pass Appropriation Acts. Parliamentary committees have examined petroleum-related matters, including petitions and concerns about oil exploration and consultation. The draft Petroleum Amendment Bill has also been subject to parliamentary consideration. These examples show that parliamentary scrutiny is possible and has been exercised. The score is 3/5 because the reviewed evidence does not establish a regular, specialised cycle of scrutiny over petroleum fiscal risks, state participation, project development plans, resource-backed borrowing and the implementation of committee recommendations.

7.4 Public participation in national petroleum policy and planning	Are citizens, civil society, affected sectors and local authorities consulted early enough to influence national petroleum policy, gas planning, infrastructure choices and benefit-sharing arrangements?	2/5	Environmental assessment processes provide opportunities for participation on particular projects, and the national policy framework has been informed by consultation processes. However, project-level EIA participation is not equivalent to an ongoing national mechanism through which the public can influence upstream policy, gas strategy, infrastructure siting, revenue priorities and the distribution of benefits. The reviewed evidence does not establish a permanent, inclusive petroleum policy forum with published submissions, government responses and feedback on how views changed decisions.
7.5 Independent audit, oversight findings and follow-up	Are findings by the Auditor-General, Ombudsman, Anti-Corruption Commission, courts and parliamentary committees made public and followed by documented corrective action?	3/5	Namibia has several independent and external accountability channels. The Auditor-General is constitutionally mandated to audit the State Revenue Fund and report to Parliament. Courts can review administrative decisions, the Ombudsman has a public accountability role, and the Anti-Corruption Commission investigates suspected corruption. Category 3 documents examples of judicial, parliamentary and ACC scrutiny in the petroleum context. The score is 3/5 because the institutions and channels exist and have been used, but the reviewed evidence does not establish a systematic public tracker showing whether recommendations, audit findings and remedial actions are implemented on time.
7.6 Civil society, media and public-interest monitoring	Are fishing industry representatives, workers, coastal communities and marine scientists included in petroleum planning and decision-making, with transparent assessment of cumulative impacts and mechanisms to address economic displacement?	2/5	Namibia has an active civil society and media environment, and public-interest organisations have contributed to debate on petroleum licensing, environmental impacts, transparency and the distribution of benefits. The parliamentary petition process and public reporting demonstrate some channels for engagement. However, the Access to Information Act had not commenced at the assessment cut-off, and the reviewed evidence does not establish a formal, resourced mechanism for regular civil society monitoring, access to government data, or government responses to independent research. This score should not be read as a general assessment of media freedom; it focuses on the petroleum-sector information and engagement framework.
7.7 Participation of fisheries and marine-dependent stakeholders	Are fishing industry representatives, workers, coastal communities and marine scientists included in petroleum planning and decision-making, with transparent assessment of cumulative impacts and mechanisms to address economic displacement?	2/5	The Marine Resources Act and environmental assessment framework provide relevant safeguards, and project assessments consider fisheries and marine ecology. Public reporting on the Venus project EIA described potential fishing-vessel exclusion zones and possible effects on fishing activity. The PEL 82 ESIA also identifies the possibility that cumulative drilling and exclusion zones could affect commercial fisheries if activity expands. These sources show that fisheries risks are recognised in project assessments. The score is 2/5 because the reviewed evidence does not establish a permanent cross-sector mechanism for fisheries participation, cumulative-impact monitoring across licence blocks, transparent assessment of livelihood losses, or a sector-wide compensation and dispute-resolution framework. This indicator complements, rather than duplicates, the ecological safeguards in Category 5.



7.8 Public feedback loops and response to community submissions	Are public comments, petitions and complaints logged, answered and tracked, with clear explanations of whether and how they influenced policy, licence and project decisions?	2/5	Environmental assessment regulations require participation records and provide processes for interested and affected parties to submit comments. Parliamentary petitions and public hearings can also bring concerns to decision-makers. However, the reviewed evidence does not establish a unified public feedback system for petroleum policy and decisions, including a searchable register of submissions, government responses, commitments, responsible agencies and implementation status. The score is 2/5 because consultation channels exist but consistent, traceable feedback and follow-through are not demonstrated.
7.9 International arbitration and enforcement readiness	Has Namibia established a clear and credible framework for recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, and are treaty status and domestic enforcement arrangements transparent to investors and the public?	1/5	The New York Convention, which has not been ratified by Namibia, is an international instrument governing recognition and enforcement of foreign and non-domestic arbitral awards; it is not itself an arbitration agreement and does not replace the need for clear dispute-resolution clauses in petroleum agreements. The UNCITRAL status table checked for this assessment lists 172 parties but does not list Namibia among the contracting states. The status table distinguishes signature from ratification or accession; Namibia is not recorded as having signed, ratified or acceded to the Convention. This is a material gap in treaty-based enforcement readiness. It should not be confused with the existence of domestic arbitration law, contractual arbitration clauses, bilateral investment treaties or other dispute mechanisms, each of which requires separate legal analysis. The score is 1/5 pending accession consideration and a clear domestic implementation and enforcement assessment.

Category summary

Current position and strengths: Namibia has constitutional provisions for parliamentary appropriation and audit, active parliamentary and public-interest engagement on petroleum issues, project-level environmental participation processes, and several independent oversight institutions. Publicly available assessments also demonstrate that fisheries and marine-dependent livelihoods have been considered in project-level impact assessments.

Weaknesses and implementation gaps: The Access to Information Act had not commenced at the assessment cut-off. Petroleum information remains fragmented, and public participation is not yet shown to operate as a continuous national feedback process. The evidence also does not establish regular parliamentary scrutiny of petroleum fiscal risks and state participation, systematic follow-up of oversight recommendations, or a standing mechanism for fisheries and coastal stakeholders. Namibia is not a party to the New York Convention according to the UNCITRAL status table checked for this assessment.

Overall score reasoning and priorities: Commence and implement the Access to Information Act; create a central petroleum transparency portal; publish submissions and reasoned government responses; establish regular parliamentary scrutiny of petroleum fiscal and borrowing risks; publish audit and recommendation follow-up; formalise fisheries and coastal stakeholder participation; and assess accession to the New York Convention alongside domestic enforcement capacity and clear contractual dispute-resolution rules.


Indicative category average: 2.11/5

CATEGORY 8: CORRUPTION PREVENTION AND INTEGRITY IN PETROLEUM GOVERNANCE

Objective: Assess whether petroleum governance contains effective safeguards against corruption, political interference, conflicts of interest, preferential access, elite capture and misuse of public office, and whether integrity rules apply to officials, politically exposed persons, companies and intermediaries.


Boundary with other categories: Category 1 assesses the existence of general anti-corruption laws; Category 3 assesses integrity controls in the licensing and contracting process. This category assesses whether these controls address the distinctive risks of political exposure, conflicts, revolving doors, elite capture and beneficial ownership in a high-value petroleum sector.

Indicator	Description	Score / relevance	Scoring justification
8.1 Identification and screening of politically exposed persons (PEPs)	Are politically exposed persons, their close associates and family members identified and subject to enhanced due diligence in petroleum licensing, procurement, beneficial ownership and financial transactions?	2/5	Namibia's anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorist-financing framework recognises politically exposed persons as a risk category for customer due diligence by accountable institutions. This provides an important baseline for financial-sector screening. The reviewed evidence does not establish a public, petroleum-specific PEP screening protocol covering licence applicants, contractors, intermediaries, state participation partners and beneficial owners, nor routine publication of the risk-management steps taken where a PEP is identified. The score is 2/5 because general financial due diligence exists but sector-specific disclosure and enforcement are not demonstrated.
8.2 Asset and interest declarations by senior public officials	Are ministers, senior petroleum decision-makers and relevant public officials required to submit verified, regularly updated asset and interest declarations, with meaningful public access and sanctions for false or incomplete declarations?	1/5	The reviewed sources do not establish a comprehensive, legally enforceable and publicly accessible asset-declaration regime covering all senior officials who can influence petroleum licensing, fiscal decisions, state participation and procurement. Existing public-service conduct rules and anti-corruption provisions do not, by themselves, demonstrate a system of regular declaration, independent verification, publication and sanctions. The score is 1/5 because this is a central safeguard against unexplained wealth and undisclosed interests in a high-value sector, and a complete operating regime was not evidenced in the material reviewed. The score should be revised if a relevant binding declaration law or official register is identified.



8.3 Conflict-of-interest disclosure and enforcement	Are officials involved in petroleum decisions required to disclose direct, indirect, family and associate interests, recuse themselves where necessary, and face independent investigation and sanctions for breaches?	2/5	The Public Procurement Act contains conflict-of-interest obligations for public-entity staff involved in procurement, including disclosure and recusal requirements, and provides offences and disciplinary consequences. The Petroleum Act also contains restrictions relevant to certain public officials holding petroleum interests, as assessed in Category 3. However, the reviewed evidence does not establish a comprehensive, consistently enforced conflict-of-interest regime covering all political office-holders and decision-makers across petroleum licensing, negotiations, state-owned enterprise participation and private contracting. The Petroleum Act restrictions do not, on their own, address every indirect interest or close-associate relationship.
8.4 Revolving-door restrictions and post-public employment	Are senior officials and regulators subject to proportionate cooling-off periods and restrictions on representing or working for petroleum companies where they had recent decision-making or confidential access?	1/5	The Public Procurement Act restricts certain public-entity staff from negotiating on behalf of suppliers in relation to contracts with which they were specifically involved while in public service. This is a targeted procurement safeguard. The reviewed evidence does not establish a comprehensive petroleum-specific cooling-off regime for ministers, senior officials, regulators, negotiators and state-enterprise executives moving into employment, advisory or lobbying roles with companies they previously regulated or contracted with. The score is 1/5 because a narrow procurement restriction does not amount to a sector-wide revolving-door policy with disclosure, monitoring and sanctions.
8.5 Safeguards against political interference in licensing and regulation	Are petroleum licensing and regulatory decisions made by a legally empowered, technically competent and accountable authority under published criteria, with recorded reasons and protection from improper political direction?	2/5	The Petroleum Act provides a statutory licensing framework and decisions can be subject to judicial and other scrutiny. Category 3 records that the Minister retains significant licensing authority and that public evidence does not consistently explain why particular applicants were selected or how competing applications were assessed. The proposed institutional reforms and UPU arrangements had not all acquired full statutory effect at the assessment cut-off. The score is 2/5 because legal procedures and external review exist, but the evidence does not yet demonstrate sufficient insulation from political discretion, a fully operational independent regulator or routine publication of reasoned award decisions. This indicator directly addresses the editor's concern that licences should be allocated by an accountable statutory body rather than through unreviewable ministerial discretion.

8.6 Prevention of elite capture and preferential access	Are there safeguards to prevent politically connected individuals, companies and intermediaries from obtaining preferential access to petroleum licences, contracts, infrastructure, information or commercial opportunities?	2/5	The Public Procurement Act promotes competition and integrity and contains provisions on conflicts, corrupt inducements and collusion. Beneficial-ownership filing requirements can help identify the natural persons behind companies. However, the reviewed evidence does not establish a petroleum-specific system that combines beneficial ownership, PEP screening, publication of evaluation criteria, disclosure of meetings and intermediaries, reasoned licensing decisions and post-award monitoring. Nor is there evidence of a public register that allows the public to trace connections between licence holders, contractors and politically exposed persons. The score is 2/5: relevant general controls exist, but an integrated anti-elite-capture system is not demonstrated
8.7 Public disclosure and verification of beneficial ownership	Are beneficial owners of petroleum licence holders, applicants, contractors, subcontractors and material counterparties required to be disclosed publicly, verified and updated throughout the life of the relevant interest?	2/5	The Companies Act, as amended, provides for beneficial-ownership records and public inspection of specified information, including full names and the nature and extent of ownership. Category 3 notes that public traceability through ownership chains is not consistently established. For this indicator, the requirement is explicit: beneficial ownership must be **disclosed publicly** in a usable form, not merely filed confidentially with an authority or available only on request. The score is 2/5 because a legal filing and limited inspection framework exists, but the reviewed evidence does not establish complete, current, verified and searchable disclosure for all petroleum licence holders and relevant contractors, including ownership through layered companies, trusts and foreign entities.
8.8 Integrity in public procurement and petroleum-related contracting	Are petroleum-related public procurement and state-enterprise contracts subject to open competition, beneficial-ownership checks, conflict disclosures, contract publication, audit and sanctions for collusion or inducements?	3/5	The Public Procurement Act sets out principles of integrity, transparency, competitive supply and value for money. Sections 66 and 66A address conduct and disclosure of interests by public-entity staff, while section 67 criminalises corrupt, fraudulent and collusive conduct by bidders and suppliers. The Public Enterprises Governance Act provides governance and annual-reporting requirements for public enterprises. These are meaningful legal controls. The score is 3/5 because the reviewed evidence does not establish that all petroleum-related contracting—including contracts by private operators and their subcontractors, where public resources or state interests are implicated—is covered by a single transparent disclosure and monitoring regime. The score also does not assume that all operator procurement is public procurement.



8.9 Anti-corruption investigation, enforcement and remedy	Can the Anti-Corruption Commission and other competent bodies independently investigate petroleum-related allegations, access relevant records, prosecute or refer cases and publish outcomes without presuming guilt?	3/5	The Anti-Corruption Act establishes the Anti-Corruption Commission and provides investigative powers and offences. Category 3 records public reporting of an ACC investigation concerning a petroleum licence matter, while also correctly noting that an investigation does not establish wrongdoing. Courts, Parliament and the Ombudsman provide additional scrutiny routes. The score is 3/5 because investigative and legal channels exist and have been used, but the reviewed evidence does not establish a consistent public record of petroleum-specific risk assessments, completed investigations, prosecution outcomes, asset recovery or implementation of remedial recommendations. The assessment must remain neutral and must not infer guilt from allegations or investigations..
8.10 Whistleblower protection and safe reporting channels	Are employees, contractors, public officials and community members able to report suspected corruption in petroleum governance confidentially and without retaliation, with independent investigation and remedies?	2/5	The Access to Information Act 8 of 2022 contains protections for good-faith disclosures made under the Act, but the Act had not commenced at the date checked. The reviewed evidence does not establish a fully operational, petroleum-specific whistleblower protection framework with confidential channels, anti-retaliation remedies, witness protection and published reporting outcomes. General anti-corruption reporting channels may exist, but they do not alone demonstrate comprehensive protection against dismissal, blacklisting, threats or commercial retaliation. The score is 2/5 because some legal foundations exist but operational protection and sector-specific implementation are not demonstrated.

Category summary

Current position and strengths: Namibia has important general integrity instruments, including the Anti-Corruption Act, Financial Intelligence Act, Public Procurement Act and Companies Act beneficial-ownership provisions. Procurement law includes conflict disclosure, recusal and offences relating to corrupt inducements and collusion. The ACC, courts, Parliament and Ombudsman provide channels for scrutiny.


Weaknesses and implementation gaps: The main gap is the absence of a clearly evidenced, integrated integrity framework tailored to the political and commercial risks of petroleum. Publicly accessible and verified asset declarations, comprehensive PEP disclosure, sector-wide revolving-door restrictions, systematic publication of beneficial ownership, and safeguards against elite capture are not sufficiently demonstrated. The licensing structure also retains substantial ministerial discretion, while the proposed institutional reforms had not all been enacted at the assessment cut-off.

Overall score reasoning and priorities: Require public disclosure of beneficial ownership for all licence holders and material contractors; establish PEP screening and verified asset declarations for senior decision-makers; introduce clear conflict-of-interest and cooling-off rules; publish reasons for licence awards and records of relevant recusals; apply open procurement and contract transparency; strengthen protected reporting; and publish anonymised enforcement statistics and follow-up outcomes. Integrity safeguards should apply to both public officials and private entities seeking petroleum rights or contracts.

Indicative category average: 2.00/5




Photo: The Namibian



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