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INSIDE THE NUMBERS OF NAMIBIA'S 2024 VOTE: FRAYING DOMINANCE, FRAGMENTED OPPOSITION



Photo: The Namibian

BY MAX WEYLANDT



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Introduction

In December 2024, the *Financial Times* [reported](#) a stunning statistic: for the first time in 120 years, incumbent parties in every election across the developed world had lost vote share that year, “as electorates punished elected officials in the aftermath of the global financial crisis.”

Swapo could not escape this global trend. But the party's problems started even earlier. After reaching a peak of 80% in the 2014 election, Swapo experienced a swift decline in electoral support. In 2019, the party won slightly fewer votes than the crucial 66% threshold needed for constitutional amendments. Then, 2024 saw another significant decline: Swapo approached the 50% mark for the first time in the history of independent Namibia, much sooner than many had anticipated.

In this paper, we take a closer look at the 2024 election, focusing on results for the National Assembly. Using constituency-level returns,¹ we identify trends in the support for Swapo and major opposition parties across the country. For Swapo, we observe three key trends over the past decade: urban centres went from solid support to contested battlegrounds, the South transformed from competitive territory to consistent opposition strongholds, and Swapo's famed northern base of support — the 4 ‘O’ regions — is starting to crumble.

We also provide a visual overview of results for Independent Patriots for Change (IPC), Affirmative Repositioning (AR), Popular Democratic Movement (PDM), and Landless People's Movement (LPM). Using survey data provided by Afrobarometer, we highlight some key differences between those who support Swapo and those who don't, focusing on age, media consumption, and economic situation.

Finally, we provide an outlook for future elections. Swapo sustained a damaging blow, but its wounds are self-inflicted, while opposition parties still hardly seem capable of inflicting any real damage themselves. The opposition remains fragmented, and it seems likely that many opposition voters only feel a weak attachment to the parties they support.

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


Figure 1. National Assembly Results. Data obtained from the Electoral Commission of Namibia's online portal elections.na on December 6, 2024.

¹ Throughout, we focus on the 121 constituencies as established by the 2012 Delimitation Commission. International votes are not included in analyses of individual constituencies, but they are counted when talking about calculations regarding national vote totals or percentages.

Key to Illustrations





Figure 3. Each map in this paper is a stylized version of Namibia. We draw each constituency the same shape and size so that all are visible. Otherwise, small but mighty constituencies would not show up even on a full-page map. Take Samora Machel — only five constituencies are smaller than this area of Windhoek, but it had 52,407 registered voters in 2024, more than any other constituency. Meanwhile Daweb, the second-largest constituency, had only 3,370 registered voters! Results are indicated using colours and symbols. You can refer back to this map as a key to identify individual constituencies.



Swapo: 2014
Overall result: 80.01%




Percent



66-100
50-66
25-50
0-25

Swapo: 2024
Overall result: 53.38%




Percentage won/lost

- 10 +
- 0 to 10
- 10 to 0
- 10 to -30
- 30 to -50

Percentage points won/lost

Figure 4. Swapo results from 2014 - 2024.

Swapo's decline is broad and comprehensive



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Figure 5. Constituency-level vote percentages for Swapo, 2014 and 2024.

Figure 5 above shows the distribution of National Assembly results for Swapo across elections. Each square represents one constituency, and its colour highlights how well the party did (using the same colour scale as the maps above). In 2014, a remarkable number of constituencies – 91 out of 121 – returned more than 66% for Swapo. The party even won more than 90% of votes in 39 of them. In 2024, its best result was 85% in Mpungu constituency, down from around 90% in both 2014 and 2019. While 2014 represented Swapo's electoral peak – which heightens the contrast shown in Figure 5 – Figure 6 demonstrates that losses compared to the 2019 election were also substantial.

In **Figure 6**, each dot represents one constituency, ordered left to right by how well Swapo did in 2019. The larger the dot, the more registered voters are in that constituency. Blue dots represent Swapo's result in 2019, and red dots show how the party did in 2024. The graph shows that Swapo lost significant amounts across the board, not just in areas where they traditionally struggle. Even the constituencies on the right side of the graph – Swapo's strongest constituencies in 2019 – experienced declines, and some of the largest drops came in constituencies where the party had won 70% or more in 2019.



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In almost every constituency, SWAPO did worse in 2024 than in 2019




Figure 6. Changes in results on the constituency level from 2019 to 2024. Each set of points - red and blue, 2024 and 2019 - represents Swapo's showing in a constituency. Constituencies are ordered by how well Swapo did in 2019. The set of points on the far right of the page is Swapo's best constituency in 2019 (Oshikunde). The blue point shows Swapo got 93% of the vote there in 2019; the red dot shows the party only got 86% in 2024.

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1. Swapo Has Lost Urban Centres

Until 2014, Swapo did quite well in the largest urban centres below the red line, in Khomas (Windhoek) and Erongo (Swakopmund and Walvis Bay).

In 2014 in Khomas, Swapo beat the two-thirds threshold in eight out of nine urban constituencies. The most populous constituencies were virtual Swapo monopolies: Samora Machel gave the party 85% of the vote, Tobias Hainyeko 87%, and Moses II Garoëb's electorate 90%. Those three constituencies alone gave Swapo almost 5% of all votes cast nationwide.

2019 saw the first serious dip. While the abovementioned constituencies still returned majorities for Swapo, the party dropped below 50% for the first time in almost all other constituencies in the central region.

By 2024, the picture had shifted comprehensively: Swapo polled below 50% in all of Windhoek's constituencies except for two. Even in those – Moses II Garoëb and Tobias Hainyeko – they dropped more than 10 percentage points and barely held on to their majority.

Erongo evinces an even more dramatic fall. Similarly to Khomas, ten years ago only one constituency (Dâures) didn't return a Swapo majority, while the party was still comfortably crossing the two-thirds threshold in large urban constituencies in Walvis Bay and Swakopmund. Ten years later it has fallen below 40% in every single constituency and has lost control of municipal councils in Walvis Bay and Swakopmund.

Swapo: Erongo				Swapo: Khomas			
Constituency	2014	2019	2024	Constituency	2014	2019	2024
Dâures	37	40	28	Samora Machel	85	54	41
Arandis	64	44	30	Khomasdal	69	42	28
Omaruru	58	55	39	MosesII Garoëb	90	62	50
Karibib	58	55	37	John Pandeni	78	49	34
Swakopmund	71	45	29	Windhoek West	65	39	33
Walvis Bay Urban	85	47	34	Tobias Hainyeko	87	68	52
Walvis Bay Rural	86	42	34	Katutura Central	50	34	20
				Windhoek East	70	40	31
				Katutura East	76	51	34
				Windhoek Rural	65	44	33

Table 1. Swapo’s percent of the vote in Erongo and Khomas, 2014, 2019, 2024.

Losing urban areas is a problem for Swapo for a very simple reason: lots of people live in urban areas. Because they contain densely-populated cities, Khomas and Erongo regions supply almost 30% of the nation’s voters. The 2023 Census indicated that 50% of the country now live in urban areas, up from 43% in 2011 (Namibia Statistics Agency 2024, p.x). Namibia is still urbanizing, so the urban population will only get larger, while the rural population shrinks.

A selection of other urban areas, albeit with smaller populations, shows similar declines across the years (Table 2). If Swapo has to rely on rural voters for wins, their foundation will become increasingly tenuous.

Constituency	2014	2019	2024	Registered Voters (2024)
!Nami#Nûs	81%	51%	41%	9,857
Keetmanshoop Urban	70%	40%	37%	13,009
Outapi	97%	85%	79%	25,519
Ondangwa Urban	86%	53%	42%	21,517
Ongwediva	89%	62%	53%	24,683
Tsumeb	82%	65%	45%	20,195
Okahandja	73%	62%	40%	24,034
Otjiwarongo	72%	62%	36%	27,566
Katima Mulilo Urban	83%	71%	55%	20,104
Mariental Urban	77%	48%	43%	11,547
Rundu Urban	80%	81%	59%	48,517
Opuwo Urban	53%	46%	42%	11,938
Eenhana	93%	80%	71%	16,311
Oshikango	88%	80%	73%	16,710
Gobabis	67%	59%	43%	18,078

Table 2. Swapo results in select urban areas, 2014, 2019, 2024.



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This emerging urban-rural divide in Namibian politics mirrors a trend seen in many other countries, both in the region and further afield. The ANC in South Africa and Zanu-PF in Zimbabwe, fellow liberation parties, rely on a rural base while cities have been opposition hotspots. This is for a variety of reasons: urbanites have higher incomes and tend to be better-educated. But more crucially, they are also exposed to more varied forms of information — especially during election campaigns, when opposition parties often concentrate their efforts in urban areas. Urban areas also feature freer social environments and stronger civil societies, while rural-dwellers might be more dependent on the state or its intermediaries for resources ([Wahman and Boone, 2018](#)). Namibia is late to the party on this particular trend. In 2010, we had one of the smallest urban-rural differences across 18 African countries analyzed by an [AfroBarometer working paper](#). But at this point, it is undeniable that the urban-rural cleavage is significant here, too.

2. The South Turns from Lukewarm to Solid Opposition

The South used to be a place where Swapo mostly did well but sometimes struggled. Now, it's a place where the party loses across the board.

Hardap and IlKaras don't supply many votes to potential parties — the south is sparsely populated, and these two regions made up less than 8 percent of the national electorate in 2024. As such, Swapo's losses here have limited impact on overall electoral success. However, the southern shift serves as a warning for the ruling party, demonstrating that entire regions can turn comprehensively against it. Erongo, Khomas, and Omaheke regions appear to be following a similar trajectory.

If Swapo's support becomes limited to the northern regions, it will require running up very high numbers to win national elections. Unfortunately for Swapo, the party is losing ground even in the north.

3. Cracks Appear in the Solid North

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Even casual observers of Namibian politics know that Swapo's most fervent support is found in the central north, in particular the so-called '4 O' regions — Oshana, Oshikoto, Ohangwena, and Omusati. Many of Swapo's liberation struggle heroes originate from these regions, and this part of the country has historically been the foundation for the party's strong wins. These regions matter because they are densely populated (accounting for just over 40% of the national population), typically show high voter turnout, and have historically voted overwhelmingly for Swapo.

But even Swapo's most ardent supporters are starting to waver. **Table 3** below shows how much of the vote Swapo won in these regions in elections, and the national vote share this translated into.

In 2014, the 4 O regions alone gave Swapo 41% of the overall national vote, because the party was still winning 92% of votes there. This solid foundation made reaching 50% or even 60% nationally relatively straightforward.

In 2024, Swapo's support had shrunk to 69% of votes in the 4Os, translating into less than 30% of all votes nationwide. While this remains a substantial portion of the electorate, it left the party with much less margin for poor performance elsewhere.

The loss of support has not been uniform. The biggest drops happened in Oshana region, where both Ondangwa constituencies fell below 50% in 2024. Swapo also lost its majority in the Tsumeb constituency of Oshikoto, and dipped below two-thirds in four other constituencies. Only in Omusati and Ohangwena did the Party retain two-thirds of the vote in every constituency, with Omusati yielding more than 70% across the board.

Looking at the returns, it seems the 4Os are becoming a thing of the past. Perhaps analysts should start speaking about the 2Os — Omusati and Ohangwena — plus Kavango West.

Year	Swapo win % in 4 O regions	% of national vote won in 4 O regions alone
1994	97%	46%
1999	96%	46%
2004	96%	38%
2009	93%	42%
2014	92%	41%
2019	78%	35%
2024	69%	29%

Table 3. Swapo’s results in the 4 O regions, 1994-2024.

IPC: 2024
Overall result: 20.21%




Figure 7. IPC results, 2024.

IPC may have already reached its electoral ceiling. While IPC emerged as the largest party in several coastal constituencies, it failed to win an outright majority anywhere. Despite leading a much more extensive campaign in 2024, party leader Panduleni Itula’s presidential vote share actually declined from 29.37% in 2019 to 25.84% in 2024.

After becoming the biggest party at Walvis Bay and sharing that status with Swapo at Swakopmund in 2020, the IPC likely hoped to use those seats of power to expand their electorate. As parties in other countries have shown, the (appearance of) competence in delivering services can boost the party brand and win new voters.

However, the IPC has struggled to demonstrate they can significantly improve service delivery. Swakopmund municipal council witnessed [infighting](#), allegations of [self-dealing](#), and a recent [loss of control](#). In Walvis Bay, [residents](#) protested against RedForce, the debt collection company appointed by the council. The council became embroiled in a [messy](#) legal [battle](#) with the company. IPC has [accused Swapo](#) of interfering with its governance efforts.

**Table 4.** Top constituencies for AR**Table 4.** Top constituencies for AR

Figure 8. AR results, 2024.


Affirmative Repositioning won just under 7%, earning them third place by quite some distance. The party only exceeded 10% in 10 constituencies.

AR's support pattern of support is different from other parties of a similar size, which often tend to have a pronounced stronghold in smaller constituencies – like LPM, which is the biggest party in several constituencies in the Hardap and Iikharas regions.

In contrast, AR relied on small but significant percentages in highly populated areas. The party failed to become the leading party anywhere and topped out at 16% in Ondangwa Rural constituency. Indeed, outside of Windhoek constituencies, most strong areas for AR were in Oshana region, home to the birthplace of AR's presidential candidate Job Amupanda.

PDM: 2024

Overall result: 5.48%



- Biggest Party in Constituency

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


Figure 9. PDM results, 2019-2024.

Following a 2019 rebranding, PDM appeared poised for a new era of competitiveness. The party capitalized on voter dissatisfaction with Swapo and the absence of other viable opposition alternatives, increasing its parliamentary representation from 5 seats in 2014 to 16 in 2019. Could this be the start of PDM's road to challenging for victory?


The 2024 results delivered a harsh reality check. PDM lost ground in nearly every constituency outside the two Kavango regions, where gains remained modest – between 1 and 7 percentage points. The party's losses were both widespread and severe.



Without those resources, and without the position of lone viable opposition in the face of an unpopular incumbent, PDM faces dim prospects for meaningful improvement.

LPM: 2024

Overall result: 5.21%



- Biggest Party in Constituency

Percentage points won/lost

- 10 +
- 0 to 10
- 10 to 0
- 10 to -30
- 30 to -50

Figure 10. LPM results, 2019-2024..

LPM delivered a respectable showing in 2024. In an election where the electorate grew by 33%, the LPM grew its voter base by 46%, increasing its tally of total votes from 38,956 to 56,971. This means a slight increase in the party's overall percentage, from 4.75% to 5.21%.

Geographically, LPM made modest improvements in the Khomas and Omaheke regions. But the key word is modest: by and large, the party remains limited to the South.

This regional focus limits the party due to the low numbers of voters in Hardap and Iikharas regions. In Namibia's electoral system, parliamentary seats are decided by total votes, not how many constituencies a party wins. AR is an instructive comparison in this regard. LPM was the biggest party in five constituencies, AR in none. LPM even won an outright majority in one constituency (Gibeon), while AR won less than 17% in each constituency. Yet AR holds one seat more in Parliament, because its relatively good performances occurred in some of the country's largest constituencies.

The maths is striking. LPM's top constituency by number of votes was Keetmanshoop Urban, where their 37.9% vote share yielded them 3,471 votes. To get the same number of votes, AR needed to win only 14.7% of Windhoek East. LPM's 51% of the vote in Gibeon came from 1,561 voters — AR got slightly more voters (1,592) from only 7.2% of Moses IlGaroëb's electorate.

Where the party did pick up some votes outside the South, as in Katutura East, Khomasdal, or Otjiwarongo constituencies, it tended to place third or lower. LPM has been successful at winning local elections and has punched above its weight in national politics. But if they want to expand their parliamentary representation, they will have to do significantly better outside the south.

Insights from Survey Data

Constituencies don't cast votes, individuals do. So what makes someone vote for SWAPO versus an opposition party? To answer this question, we need data about individual voters, which comes from surveys. There is little high-quality survey data about Namibian politics. Fortunately, the recurring Afrobarometer survey project includes questions about elections. In March 2024, Afrobarometer conducted a high-quality nationally representative survey of 1,200 Namibians, asking about their attitudes on a wide variety of economic, social, and political issues. Crucially, they also asked: "If national elections were held tomorrow, which candidate's party would you vote for?"

Not all respondents answered this question: 24% percent were 'shy' respondents: they said they would not vote, didn't know whom they'd vote for, or refused to answer altogether. Despite this limitation, the survey was reasonably predictive: 50% of respondents claimed they would vote for Swapo in the election (compared to the 53% who actually did).

The only major surprise was IPC, who did significantly better than predicted by the survey. This pattern has appeared before – small parties tend to do the same in the election as in the survey, but a significant chunk of the 'shy' respondents eventually choose someone from the ruling party or the leading opposition. In the past, this often benefited Swapo, but recently it has helped the Popular Democratic Movement (PDM) and now IPC. This suggests that a significant portion of voters have weak party loyalties.

Because of the large share of respondents who did not pick a party, we should interpret results with a grain of salt. Nevertheless, the survey data show some striking differences between those respondents who said they would vote for Swapo and the rest.²


Out of a wide range of questions, a random forest algorithm determined the ones that best predicted whether a respondent said they would vote for Swapo. In short, the results indicate: people who say they will vote for Swapo tend to be older, and consume less news via television and social media (**Figure 11**). They are more likely to live in rural constituencies and constituencies with higher unemployment (**Figure 12**).

² I am counting all respondents, not just those who professed a vote choice. Specifically, respondents who respond 'Don't know', 'Would not vote', and refused to answer are counted as no, voters who claim they will vote for Swapo as yes.



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These relationships should not be interpreted as causal. For example, Swapo does better than the opposition in districts with lower levels of employment. Does this mean that poverty directly causes support for Swapo? Not necessarily: rural areas have lower employment levels, and urban areas higher ones. Since urban areas support opposition parties for various reasons (as discussed above), the real causal factor might be urban versus rural location, not employment levels. Similarly, do the results below mean that watching more television causes a dislike for Swapo (perhaps because of the tone of coverage)? No: perhaps young people watch more TV than older voters – and maybe older voters remain loyal to Swapo because they remember the struggle against apartheid.



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


Figure 11. Swapo versus others on age and media consumption. Question: If presidential elections were held tomorrow, which party's candidate would you vote for? Swapo: those who responded 'Swapo'. 'Not Swapo': those who picked another party, 'don't know', 'will not vote', and refused to answer

Constituencies that voted for Swapo have fewer employed people
This reflects the urban-rural divide in the electorate.




Figure 12. Constituency-level election results for Swapo and employment to Population Ratio (proportion of the population over age 15 that has a job). Each dot represents one constituency. Constituencies further to the right have higher employment levels. Constituencies higher up voted for Swapo at higher rates. Employment data courtesy of the Namibia Statistics Agency.

Looking Forward

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The numbers above look bleak for Swapo. From a high of 80% just ten years ago, the party has now declined to a point where it barely scraped a majority. It has lost crucial ground in urban centres and in its northern heartland, while becoming locked out of several constituencies (and town councils) in the South.

Optimism took a dive after 2017




Figure 13. Three indicators of economic optimism.

Note: Percent of respondents that responded in the following ways:

Would you say that the country is going in the wrong direction or going in the right direction? Right Direction.

In general, how would you describe: Your own present living conditions? Fairly Good or Very Good.

Looking ahead, do you expect economic conditions in this country to be better or worse in twelve months' time? Better or Much Better.

Data courtesy of Afrobarometer Rounds 6,7,8,9,10.



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Concerns about corruption surely played a significant role. A key development in this regard was the 'Fishrot' scandal, which implicated senior Swapo officials in a massive corruption scandal that even linked back to the party itself, in the form of allegations that proceeds from corruption were being used to fund election campaigns. But the concerns are also of a more fundamental economic nature. **Figure 13** tracks three indicators of public sentiment on the economy from the Afrobarometer: a question on whether the country will be better or worse off in 12 months, an evaluation of the respondent's own condition, and a broader question on whether the country is heading in the right direction. In all three questions, a clear majority of Namibians were optimistic until 2017. The exact turning point is difficult to establish, but by the time Afrobarometer asked again in August 2019, the mood had cratered, and it hasn't recovered.

In parallel, Afrobarometer survey results show a striking collapse in Namibians' faith in Swapo (**Figure 14**). In the 2017 survey, 72% of Namibians said they trusted the ruling party 'Somewhat' or 'A lot'. By August of 2019 that number was down to 57%, before declining to just short of 40 percent in 2021.




Figure 14. Trust in Swapo and Opposition Parties.

Note: Percent of respondents that responded in the following ways:

How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say:

The Ruling Party? How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Opposition Political Parties? Somewhat or A Lot.

Data courtesy of Afrobarometer Rounds 6,7,8,9,10.

But the same graph also illustrates that Swapo faces limited danger from the opposition. While trust in Swapo declined precipitously, trust in opposition parties never increased to a similar degree. It seems that while Swapo's wounds are self-inflicted, the opposition has not grown strong enough to seriously harm them.

Indeed, even though 2024 was by far Swapo's worst performance in an election, opposition parties remained far removed from governance. Even the top opposition, IPC, did not get even half the votes Swapo did. As such 2024 continues an old tale in Namibian politics (**Figure 15**), one where the opposition may command a non-trivial share of the vote, but the votes are divided among so many players that it is difficult to imagine a change of policy direction as a result.




Figure 15. National Assembly election results for Swapo and major opposition parties, 1989-2024.

Consider **Figure 16**, which graphs the biggest party in each constituency. Swapo may have lost its majority in many constituencies, but in most, the party remains the largest force out of all contenders. Only in Erongo (IPC), Hardap and Karas do we see a significant proportion of constituencies in the hands of the opposition. This is partially because of the geographic concentration of some parties. **Table 5** shows the proportion of a party's vote that comes from their ten best constituencies. Some parties are extremely narrowly focused – for example 68% of the UDF's votes come from just ten constituencies. Localized support is beneficial — parties can point to a record of good governance to boost their credibility in national elections — but at the end of the day, national vote counts determine power in the National Assembly. Only a small number of opposition parties have a broader base of support. But none come close to Swapo.

Party	Votes from top 10 constituencies	Votes Nationwide	Proportion of votes from top 10 constituencies
UDF	11,424	16,828	68%
NUDO	6,689	10,687	63%
SWANU	6,575	11,484	57%
PDM	25,438	59,839	43%
LPM	22,993	56,971	40%
AR	25,800	72,227	36%
IPC	73,578	220,809	33%
SWAPO	118,220	583,300	20%

Table 5. Party reliance on a small number of stronghold constituencies.

Swapo remains the top choice in most places




Figure 16. the biggest party in each constituency in 2024.
Dots indicate constituencies where the largest party won more than 50% of the vote.



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PDM looks unlikely to become a major force again any time soon. They benefited from the turn against Swapo in 2019 – but clearly could not convince voters to stick with them. Voters were happy to use PDM as a tool to punish Swapo, but hold no strong attachments to the party. As **Figure 17** shows, the proportion of Namibians that answered “PDM” when asked if they feel close to a political party has not made it past 5% in over a decade, even as the party won up to 16% of the vote.




Figure 17. Closeness to PDM.

Note: Percent of Namibians who responded ‘yes’ to ‘Do you feel close to any particular political party?’ and, when asked ‘Which party is that?’ responded with DTA/PDM. Data courtesy of Afrobarometer Rounds 1, 1.5, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.

The closest competitor in terms of spread, IPC, is also Swapo’s closest rival for vote count. However, there are reasons to believe much of the support IPC has gained is not strongly committed to the party. In the last Afrobarometer survey, only 5% of voters said they would vote for IPC, but the party outperformed that prediction by 15%, winning 20% of the national vote. In 2019, PDM outperformed the poll by 12.5%. But as noted above, those voters likely supported PDM because they were latching on to whoever they saw as the strongest challenger in the moment. They are liable to jump ship from the IPC to a different challenger, just as they left PDM for IPC, unless IPC can find a way of keeping them on board.

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The Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) is a not-for-profit organisation with a mission to deliver independent, analytical, critical yet constructive research into social, political and economic issues that affect development in Namibia. The IPPR was established in the belief that free and critical debate informed by quality research promotes development.

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