



CULTURE, PERFORMANCE AND THE ORIGINS OF POLITICAL TRUST IN NAMIBIA

1. Introduction

There is broad agreement and disagreement among scholars about political trust. Whilst they generally agree that trust in political institutions has declined significantly over the past few decades – especially in the developed world – they disagree about the consequences thereof. Some argue that it is not necessarily a bad thing, as democracy seems to benefit when citizens become more ‘critical’. Various others have linked low levels of political trust with an increase in system-challenging behaviour. Others yet have argued that political trust is an important indicator of legitimacy, and widespread legitimacy is a necessary condition for political regimes. Without sufficient levels of trust there would simply not be enough support for political institutions to govern effectively.

In the debate on whether declining levels of political trust have substantive consequences in democratic states, scholars emphasise the importance of the focus on political trust and support. If the focus is on politicians, the consequences are less troublesome as it is easy to replace these distrusted office bearers through elections (Dalton, 2004: 157–159; Klingemann & Fuchs 1995: 2–5). If on the other hand, the declining trust is in the fundamental structures and institutions that make up the democratic system, the consequences are more serious and impactful. Making use of this distinction, Inglehart (1999: 236–256) argues that whilst trust in politicians and elected officials is declining, support for democratic institutions and values are on the increase - meaning that the decline in trust does not pose a threat to



the democratic regimes of the West. Norris (1999) argues the same point when she states that citizens have become critical of how democracy currently works, but without withdrawing their support for and commitment to democracy.

It would be very difficult to argue that most ordinary Namibians had any trust in the colonial political dispensation. For the most part the system of administration was rooted in racial discrimination, social and economic inequality, ethnic divisions, violent political oppression and military occupation. Legally and politically the system was deemed illegal and illegitimate. It was a system that ruled by force not consent; its survival did not depend on wide-spread belief in its legitimacy but rather upon its capacity to contain violent uprisings and system-challenging political behaviour.

After having gained its independence from South Africa in 1990, Namibia established an entirely new and democratic regime with new institutions, new leaders and new social and political values. After more than a century of colonial occupation and authoritarian rule, Namibia became a democracy; albeit a democracy without democrats, and without any experience with democratic rule. Whatever political trust existed, was vested in the liberation movement (SWAPO¹) that became Namibia's first ruling party. Seeing that the motive for the liberation struggle was self-determination and not necessarily the establishment of (liberal) democracy, popular orientations toward the new political system depended heavily on who assumed power and not so much on the type of system or the nature of its institutions. In the beginning, in the absence of performance indicators, trust in its democratic institutions 'spilled over' and 'spilled up' from the trust Namibians put in their liberators.

This paper looks at the origins of political trust in Namibia by examining two contending theories for explaining political trust: cultural and institutional. The relative importance of cultural and institutional factors in predicting political trust is tested by means of a multiple linear regression model, using the most recent data that was collected during Round 8 of the Afrobarometer survey.²

2. The liberation struggle: the gift that keeps on giving

The liberation struggle that lasted in one form or another for most of the 20th century continues to have a lasting effect on post-colonial Namibia's socio-political and economic dispensation. It is arguably the single most significant political cleavage that shapes the country's single-dominant party system and it is crucial for understanding who obtains political power and who does not.

At independence Swapo Party inherited a political system with no trust and no legitimacy; a polity divided along ethnic and racial lines; one of the most unequal societies in the world; an economy controlled by a small white minority who benefited greatly from the colonial occupation and a population within which a large majority lacked the education and skill to achieve upward mobility.

The purpose of the liberation struggle was to achieve self-determination, not to establish liberal democracy. Deep-rooted liberal democratic notions such as free, fair and regular multiparty elections, political and civic pluralism, rule of law, separation of powers, universal civil liberties and political freedoms that extend to all - including opposition parties - were not part of the political culture of the liberation struggle and hence, not always acceptable.

After independence Swapo Party persisted with a strategy of 'exclusive nationalism' to maintain electoral dominance. This involves conflating 'the nation' and 'the party': "Swapo is the nation and the nation is Swapo". The armed struggle is made the basis providing historical legitimacy and once in power, the party became the government and the state. In the words of RW Johnson (2001), "no further group can succeed them for that would mean that the masses, the forces of righteousness, had been overthrown". From now on, Swapo Party would employ "patriotic history"³ to mobilize voters. In this construction of history, Swapo Party is portrayed as the "liberators" and the opposition as the "sell-outs". In this view, voting for opposition parties stopped nothing short of "committing treason".

Although the liberation movement inherited a highly unequal and racially divided nation at Independence, it was shaped by a series of constitutional compromises and "reform bargains" (Southall 2014)

¹ Originally SWAPO was the acronym used for the South West African People's Organization. Shortly after independence the name changed to Swapo Party. Although both terms are used interchangeably in Namibia, I will use the former to distinguish the liberation movement from the party.

² Afrobarometer heads a pan-African, non-partisan research network that conducts public attitude surveys on democracy, governance, economic conditions, and related issues across Africa. Seven rounds of surveys have been completed in up to 38 countries since 1999. Afrobarometer conducts face-to-face interviews in the language of the respondent's choice with nationally representative samples. The Afrobarometer team in Namibia, led by Survey Warehouse, interviewed 1,200 adult Namibians in August 2019 for Round 8. A sample of this size yields country-level results with a margin of error of +/-3 percentage points at a 95% confidence level. Previous surveys were conducted in Namibia in 1999, 2003, 2006, 2008, 2012, 2014, and 2017.

³ See Ranger (2004).

that restricted the number and nature political and economic pathways available for transforming the highly skewed and deeply divided Namibian nation. By means of Resolution 435, SWAPO had committed to a political dispensation based on the principles of liberal democracy that included the separation of powers, extensive, constitutionally protected freedom and liberty for all, protected property rights, a proportional representative list electoral system, and a bi-cameral legislature.

Economically, the liberation movement's hands were similarly tied. It had to abolish all substantive commitments to socialism and plans to nationalize key parts of the economy. These were replaced with investor-friendly and market-oriented policies aimed at prioritizing growth over socio-economic redistribution and did little to redress the enduring inequalities of the past. For example, the Government could acquire white-owned agricultural land only through the "willing buyer willing seller" principle enshrined in the constitution. This meant that post-independence land reform was both slow and expensive, and a source of much frustration. The lack of education and skills among previously disadvantaged Namibians further inhibited upward mobility.

The only option for economic transformation was through the attainment of political power, i.e. by 'capturing' the state. Fusing the old and new administrations caused the state to become 'bloated' quite rapidly and laid the groundwork for the development of state and government-based networks of socio-political and economic patronage.

Swapo Party became Namibia's ruling party after securing 57% of the vote during the country first democratic elections held in 1989. It increased its electoral dominance of the National Assembly and Presidential elections with every election since then until 2014 when it obtained 80% of votes cast. It's presidential candidate, Hage Geingob did even better, securing 87% of the votes cast.

In 2019 Swapo Party's share of votes declined by 15 percentage points whilst that of the incumbent president declined by 30. For the first time since 1994, the ruling party did not obtain a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly. With three consecutive years of economic recession, subsequent major job losses and a crippling drought over the past four years, many Namibians are struggling adapt to with the impact of the economic contraction on their personal living conditions. Growing public perception that corruption is on the increase and that the economy is heading in the wrong direction means that public views on Government's performance are their lowest levels since 1999.

This raises a number of important questions. First, does this mean that the liberation honeymoon is coming to an end, and that the political cohesion based on the carefully crafted and manipulated 'patriotic history' is nearing its end? Has the liberation struggle reached its political expiry date? Second, does this mean that Namibians have become more 'issue conscious' and thus more performance driven? Or do cultural influences remain important for how Namibians view their institutions? Have they become 'critical citizens' determined to hold Government accountable based on its handling of key issues, or have they all together lost faith in democracy's ability to deliver? If so, are they prepared to break with the Government and ruling party, or is that tipping point still some time away?

3. What is trust and why does it matter?

3.1. What is political trust?

Trust is a subjective phenomenon. It is 'in the eyes of the beholder' and it matters because it shapes behavior. In the now classic depiction of trust, Easton (1965) declared that trust in government represents the confidence of citizens in the actions of a "government to do what is right and perceived fair". Bouckaert and van de Walle (2003) went further when they argued that it depends on the congruence between citizens' preferences for what is right and fair and the actual perceived functioning of government.

Citizen expectations are key to their trust in government. Several factors, such as increased levels of education, changes in living conditions and increases in income may cause their expectations to rise. If a government's performance does not meet rising expectations, satisfaction and trust could decline. According to Dalton (2005) changes in expectations of citizens in advanced democracies resulted from social change and social modernization that often went undetected by political leaders. In addition to declining levels of trust, other aspects of political support such as confidence in political institutions, party attachments, support for political parties, and public confidence in parliament and other political institutions are similarly affected.

In addition, citizens' trust towards government is influenced differently depending on whether they have a positive or negative experience with service delivery. Presumably, negative experiences have much stronger impact on trust in government than a positive one.

Citizens may have very diverse preferences and as such, they may use a multitude of different cri-

teria to evaluate government's performance. In order to analyse and understand what influences trust in government, one needs to compare their preferences with their perceptions of government's functioning. Therefore, since it is not the actual performance of government but its perceived performance that matters for trust in government, the drivers of perceptions besides governmental performance need to be identified as well.

3.2. Why does trust matter?

Trust matters for a variety of reasons. Turper and Aarts (2017), argue that trust is an important indicator of political legitimacy and that legitimacy (and hence, trust) is a necessary condition for the survival of the regime. Hooghe and Marien (2013) found that citizens with low levels of trust in institutions engage less in institutionalized forms of participation and are more likely to engage in system-challenging behaviour and they are less likely to comply with the laws of the land (Marien and Hooghe, 2011).

The OECD also establishes a link between declining levels of trust and lower rates of compliance with regulations and rules. Businesses and citizens may become more risk-averse and thus more likely to delay investment, innovation and employment decision. This has a negative effect on competitiveness and growth. The authors argue that "As a result, trust in government by citizens and businesses is essential for the effective and efficient policy making both in good times and bad. Investing in trust should be considered as a new and central approach to restoring economic growth and reinforcing social cohesion, as well as a sign that governments are learning the lessons of the crisis" (OECD, 2013:22).

Trust generates social cohesion and enhances governments' ability to govern without having to resort to coercion. It may thus lower the transaction costs in political relationships and may increase efficiency and effectiveness in government operations. Trust could also reduce opportunities for free riding and opportunistic behavior. Where political institutions are trusted citizens may be more willing to accept legislation and abide by the decisions made by these institutions. Trust may therefore enhance citizen's willingness to obey legislation or pay taxes.

4. Origins of Trust

Mishler and Rose (2001) present a framework for understanding the origins of trust. Their framework is useful to identify, order and organize the independent variables for the model used in this study of political trust. This will also help determine the extent to which each of the two theories is useful for understanding political trust in independent Namibia. Seeing that there is only one country in this study, and that the focus is on within country variance, only micro-level variables⁴ are included.

Mishler and Rose, distinguish between cultural and institutional theories of trust. Within the cultural tradition, trust in political institutions is exogenous, i.e. it originates outside the realms of politics "in long-standing and deeply seeded beliefs about people that are rooted in cultural norms and communicated through early-life socialization" (2001:31).

From a cultural perspective, institutional trust is an extension of interpersonal trust that is projected onto political institutions. They argue that: "Although politically exogenous, interpersonal trust helps make political institutions work because it "spills over," [...], into cooperation with people in local civic associations and then "spills up" to create a nationwide network of institutions necessary for representative government (2001:34). Micro-theories emphasize the fact that "the impact of culture on individual trust is likely to vary with the specific nature of the socialization process and the face-to-face experiences of each person (2001:35).

Institutional theories of trust, on the other hand, propose that trust in political institutions is endogenous, i.e. that trust is a consequence, and not a cause, of institutional performance. In the institutional view, "Trust in institutions is rationally based; it hinges on citizen evaluations of institutional performance. Institutions that perform well generate trust; untrustworthy institutions generate skepticism and distrust" (Mishler and Rose 2001:31).

For new institutions such as with the new post-colonial institutions in Namibia, the cultural trust targeted at the liberation movement and perpetuated through the strategies of 'exclusive nationalism' and the manipulation of the 'patriotic history' may have benefitted the country's institutions, but it may not be sufficient to maintain trust over any longer period of time. In the longer term, so the argument goes, institutions must

⁴ In their original breakdown of the sources of trust the authors distinguished micro- and macro-level variables that are distinguishable within both the cultural and the institutional theories of trust. They argue: "Within both cultural and institutional theories, important distinctions exist between macro and micro variants. Whereas macro-cultural theories emphasize the homogenizing tendencies of national traditions and make little allowance for variation in trust among individuals within societies, micro- cultural theories focus on differences in individual socialization experiences as sources of significant variation in political trust within as well as between societies." Clearly with only one case, micro-level theories are the most appropriate as they are the only theories that explain within country variance.

earn their trust; trust must become performance-based if Namibia's political institutions were to survive and function effectively after Independence.

5. Explaining Trust in Namibia

5.1. The Independent Variables (IVs)

5.1.1. Cultural variables

It was argued earlier in the paper that Namibia's liberation struggle had an enormous influence on the country's political dispensation. It influenced – and most likely still influences – how Namibians think and feel about institutions, and about each other. Thus, in addition to the standard cultural trust-related variables – age, income, education, gender and urban/rural location – this paper explores some uniquely Namibian variables that would have an influence on how Namibians view one another.

Firstly, it is proposed that where someone lived during the liberation war would have had a significant impact on their socialisation and thus on their political preferences and orientations. Not all regions in the country had equal exposure and thus equal experiences during the liberation war. To account for this, regions without any full-time military occupation have to be distinguished from those that were partially occupied by military forces, and those that were fully occupied and thus lived with the violent brunt of the war on a daily basis. Regions without military occupation were scored (1); those with partial occupation (2); and those fully occupied (3)⁵. It is proposed that those who had deeper and more regular exposure to the adverse effects of liberation war would hold higher levels of trust in political institutions because they still associate these institutions with the victorious war of liberation.

Secondly, it is proposed that members of the dominant ethnic group would rate political institutions more positively than members of smaller ethnic groups because they may view these institutions as “closer” to their own ethnic group, partly because many more members of the dominant ethnic group are employed in these institutions and because at least some institutions rely heavily on the political support of the largest ethnic group, meaning that this group will be canvassed intensively. That may make the bond of affection between the group and the institution will be stronger than with any other group. Yet another possibility holds that given that the roots of the liberation movement lies within the largest ethnic group and seeing that, this ethnic group has been hardest hit by the colonial military occupation, it is argued that their loyalty to the post-colonial institutions would be strongest as they gained more than smaller groups living outside the war zone. Lastly, it is also possible that members of the largest ethnic group benefits disproportionately from institutional benefits due to ethnic-based clientelism. Overall, this variable will provide some evidence on whether ethnicity still has some salience at all. Members of the country's largest ethnic group, the Oshiwambo speakers, have been coded (1) differently from members of all other ethnic groups (0).

Third, it is proposed that Namibians who grew up during the time of the liberation war, would have been socialised differently from those who were born after Independence (the so-called Born-Frees). Age is thus expected to have a significant influence on how much Namibians trust their institutions. It is expected that older Namibians will show much higher levels of trust in political institutions, whilst the younger generations will be more critical. This is partly because the older generations will have some residual loyalty toward those who won liberation, whilst the Born-Frees will not. Trust in the latter group will be driven by performance only. Furthermore, whereas the older generation will have the performance of the colonial administration as some reference point against which to measure the performance of the post-colonial institutions, the Born-Frees will not. They will thus not be able to contextualise the performance of the post-colonial institutions. Age is entered into as a continuous variable ranging from 18 to the oldest respondent.

Fourth, Urban/Rural Location is also expected to shape trust in political institutions for a number of possible reasons. First, rural Namibians benefited substantially from Independence. The Namibian government constructed infrastructure, developed markets, provided and channelled development aid and provided much needed basic services to rural areas where previously there was only war and poverty. Rural areas are also often ‘further away’ from the daily trials and tribulations of the post-colonial government. They are thus less likely to experience the typical economic struggles that the urban population have to deal with: rising food and fuel prices, electricity shortages, housing shortages, over-crowded schools, inadequate sewerage and increases in transport and property prices. Rural folk may just have a ‘more forgiving’ view of institutions than their urban counterparts, because they are less reliant on institutions to start with, but also much less likely to be exposed with the failure or inefficiencies of institutions. Rural Namibians are

⁵ The so-called Red-Line, the veterinary fence that demarcated the border between commercial and communal farmland, was used to recode the regions because for all practical purposes it also served as the southern border of the militarised zone. The following regions were coded (1): Karas, Hardap, Erongo, Khomas, Otjozondjupa and Omaheke. Kunene and Oshikoto were coded (2) whilst all remaining regions were coded (3).

thus expected to have a more positive view of political institutions, which in turn, will cause them to show higher levels of trust in these institutions.

Fifth, it is proposed that poverty will have a significant impact on how Namibian views their institutions. Those who are poorer will have less trust as they are likely to have less access to services, or alternatively, they might only have access to lesser quality services. To test for the effect of poverty a number of variables are entered: Lived Poverty which measures how often someone have gone without necessities such as cash, water, food, cooking fuel and medical care.

Sixth, several studies of political trust in advanced democracies have shown that citizens with higher levels of education display higher levels of trust. This is especially true when (high) levels of education are combined with (high) interest in politics to distinguish citizens with higher levels of 'political sophistication' from those who have lower levels of political sophistication (see for example Turper S and K Aarts, 2017). Because Round 8 of the Afrobarometer does not contain the 'interest in politics' item, 'political sophistication' cannot be computed. Instead we employ the 'level of education' item only and propose that better educated Namibians will show higher levels of trust based on the premise that they are most likely to extract benefits from the employment and business opportunities created by political institutions.

Seventh, Namibia has started to address a number of the well-known problems facing women quite successfully.⁶ Overall, however, the country's scorecard for gender equality shows mixed results. The country has small gender gaps in literacy and education, but income remains highly unequal even though it is slightly lower than the average for African continent. After the 2014 national elections and 2015 regional elections, 41% of National Assembly representatives were women, and in the National Council women constituted 24% of representatives. In 2015 women comprised 22% of the country's cabinet positions and in the same year 48% of local councillors were women. Given that progress made towards gender equality especially with regard to political participation and representation, it is proposed that women may have higher levels of political trust than men.

The final cultural variable is social trust. Social trust, it is argued, often precedes political trust (Mishler and Rose, 2001). For some, political trust is nothing else than a transfer of general trust on to political institutions and elites. Rather it is a result of what is called the 'civic culture' of a society (Putnam, 2000, 1993; Almond and Verba 1963; and Marien and Hooghe, 2011). In this view institutional trust is an extension of interpersonal trust that is learned early in life, and then, much later, is projected onto political institutions, thereby conditioning institutional performance capabilities. It is expected that higher levels of social trust will lead to higher levels of political trust.

Overall it is expected that only some of the cultural variables will be significant predictors of trust. At the same time, it is proposed that performance variables will be highly significant for explaining the current status of political trust in Namibia. Although it is not done in this paper, future research should analyse if the overall importance of cultural variables for political trust have changed over time and to establish whether or not performance variables have become more important. At what point in the future, if at all, do performance variables replace cultural variables in explaining trust?

5.1.2. Performance Indicators

The first performance variable assesses public perceptions on the series of items aimed at measuring Economic Policy Performance. This variable is a composite index consisting of five variables – managing the economy, improving living standards for the poor, creating jobs, keeping prices stable and narrowing gaps between the rich and poor. Responses were solicited by means of the question, "How well or badly would you say the present government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say?" The detailed factor loadings as well as the outcome of the Reliability Analysis for the scale appears in Appendix 1.

The second performance variable deals with Basic Service Provision Performance. Like the Economic Policy Performance index, this is a composite index consisting of five items: improving basic health services, addressing educational needs, providing water and sanitation services, maintaining roads and bridges and providing a reliable supply of electricity. Responses were solicited by means of the I, "How well or badly would you say the present government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say?" The detailed factor loadings as well as the outcome of the Reliability Analysis for the scale also appears in Appendix 1 below.

The Afrobarometer also taps into citizen's perceptions on the performance of their leaders. The Political Leaders Performance scale is a composite index based on the perceived performance of 8 leaders or leadership positions: President Hage Geingob, Prime Minister Saara Kuugongelwa, Members of the National Assembly, Representatives to the National Council, Regional Councillors, and Regional Governors. Responses were solicited by means of the question: "Do you approve or disapprove of the way that the

⁶ Legal Assistance Centre (2017)

following people have performed their jobs of the past 12 months, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?" The detailed outcome of the data reduction procedure and Reliability Analysis is contained in Appendix 2 below.

The next performance indicator is based on citizens' perceptions of whether government institutions are responsive, i.e. open to listen to and respond to their needs. The Government Responsiveness scale consists of four items reporting on the frequency with which members of the National Assembly, representatives to the National Council, Local Authority councillors and Regional Councillors listen to what citizens have to say. The actual question asks "How much of the time do you think the following try their best to listen to what people like you have to say?" The detailed outcome of the data reduction procedure and Reliability Analysis is contained in Appendix 3 below.

In addition to the above-mentioned composite indexes, two additional elements of what is considered regime performance are selected for the analysis. The first is Satisfaction with Democracy and is measured by the question: "Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Namibia? It is a five-point scale with response-options ranging from "very satisfied" to "Namibia is not a democracy". The second is an item that measures the Overall Level of Corruption in the country. The question is "In your opinions, over the past year, has the level of corruption in the country increased, decreased, or stayed the same?". Response-options constitutes a 5-point Likert-scale that ranges from "Increased a Lot (1)" to "Decreased a Lot (5)".

5.2. The Dependent Variable (DV)

Trust in political institutions is the dependent variable. The Afrobarometer taps into public trust in political institutions by means of a question that asks, "How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?" This is directed at a list of 15 institutions that include the following: the National Council; Local Authority Councillors; the National Assembly; Regional Councillors; Regional Governors; the Prime Minister; the President; the Electoral Commission of Namibia; the Ruling Party; the Police; the Namibia Defence Force; Courts of Law; the Ministry of Finance, Dept. Inland Revenue; and opposition parties. The result of the Factor Analysis (see Appendix 4) suggested that the individual items could be reduced to two factors: one that represented trust in government institutions and another representing state institutions. Seeing that the first factor is much more comprehensive and covers institutions in all levels of government, and that it includes the primary bodies for designing policy, it will be our Dependent Variable: Trust in Political Institutions.

5.3. Research Questions and Key Propositions

The primary research question for this paper deals with the possible sources of political trust. More specifically, within the parameters of cultural and institutional sources of trust in post-colonial Namibia, which are the most significant individual predictors of trust in political institutions?

Secondly, this paper also deals with understanding whether or not Namibia's liberation struggle, after nearly 30 years of Independence, still has a significant influence on political trust. As such, do Namibians still consider the cultural influences of ethnicity and the liberation war when they decide whether or not an institution should be trusted or distrusted? If so, are these influences still significant?

Third, it needs to be established whether or not institutional performance play any significant role in shaping institutional trust, and if so, are all aspects of performance equally important. To this effect, there is a need to ask, whether or not political and economic performances have equally significant effects on political trust? If not, which of the two is more significant?

Considering that no existing model of trust is tested here, a number of research propositions (as opposed to hypotheses) are postulated to guide the analysis.

- It is proposed here that the delivery of basic services will have a significant influence on how much citizens will trust or distrust their institutions.
- It is also proposed here that economic policy performance will have a significant influence on how much citizens will trust or distrust their institutions.
- It is also proposed here that political performance will have a significant influence on how much citizens will trust or distrust their institutions.
- It is also proposed here that the democratic regime's performance will have a significant influence on how much citizens will trust or distrust their institutions.
- It is also proposed here that perceptions on corruption will have a significant influence on how much citizens will trust or distrust their institutions.

The answers to these questions and propositions are presented in the next section. They appear in parenthesis at the end of each paragraph.

6. The Analysis

Figure 1 contains the un-standardised and standardised coefficients for both the cultural and institutional independent variables. Overall the model is significant ($F=23.29$; $p=.000$). The adjusted R^2 suggests that there is significant shared variance between at least some of the variables in the model, and as such, the model will be useful for enhancing our understanding of political trust ($R^2 = .298$.) Three cultural and four institutional variables are found to be statistically significant predictors of institutional trust. The cultural variables are: being a member of the largest ethnic group; living inside the war zone; and being older. The institutional variables are: Economic Policy Performance, Performance Political Leaders, Government Responsiveness, and Overall level of corruption. Together with some other (statistically insignificant) variables they explain a significant amount of variance in Namibia’s political trust.

First, this model confirms Mishler and Rose’s (2001) prediction that early life cultural influences continue to shape political trust alongside institutions; perhaps even longer than we expect. As such cultural influences on trust may never get completely replaced by institutional factors. In their words: “[...] insofar as political institutions persist and perform relatively consistently over successive generations, political socialization and institutional performance should exert very similar and reinforcing effects on trust in institutions”. In our model, being a member of the largest ethnic group, living within what once was the war zone and being older all have significant bearing - alongside a number of performance variables - on trust in political institutions. But overall it is confirmed that within the confines of our model of political trust, the liberation struggle matters, and it matters a lot, as it continues to shape trust in political institutions. It also confirms that ethnic identity has a significant influence on political trust.

Przeworski, et.al. (1996) argued that in democracies where the structure and character of institutions remains constant for extended periods of time, policy performance and particularly economic policy performance is empathized; institutions are trusted or distrusted to the extent that they produce desired economic outcomes. The model presented here shows that there is qualified support for that notion in Namibia. Economic Policy Performance is indeed a significant predictor of political trust but compared to the Performance of Political Leaders, Government Responsiveness and the Overall Level of Corruption, it is a weak predictor ($\beta=.087$; $t=2.132$; $p<.05$). The significance of economic policy performance is thus confirmed within the confines of this model of trust, but it is not as strong a predictor as was originally proposed.

Figure 1: Multiple linear regression: Trust in political institutions

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
Cultural	(Constant)	-.870	.235		-3.708	
	Urban/Rural	.022	.067	.013	.331	.741
	Gender	-.065	.054	-.038	-1.220	.223
	Oshiwambo-speaker	.248	.062	.144	4.032	.000
	Within War Zone	.094	.036	.103	2.586	.010
	Age	.005	.002	.074	2.269	.024
	Lived Poverty Index	.034	.035	.033	.969	.333
	General trust	.034	.080	.014	.425	.671
	Education	.014	.016	.031	.861	.390
Institutional	Basic Services Provision Performance	0.62	.045	.058	1.378	.169
	Economic Policy Performance	.116	.055	.087	2.132	.033
	Performance Political Leaders	.425	.049	.292	8.596	.000
	Government Responsiveness	.125	.037	.115	3.415	.001
	Overall level of corruption	.097	.026	.123	3.771	.000
	Satisfaction with democracy	.061	.031	.065	1.939	.053

a. Dependent Variable: Trust in Political Institutions (9 Item Scale)

Mishler and Rose (2001) also hypothesise that “In new democracies, however, the political character of institutions can matter as much as their policy outputs, and political outputs can matter as much as economic performance. In these contexts, popular trust in institutions likely is a consequence of both political and economic performance”. The model presented here presents mixed results. In so far as Satisfaction with Democracy is a measure of how well the regime is performing, there is no support for the hypothesis within this model. Satisfaction with Democracy has an insignificant effect on political trust. Yet our model of political trust shows that the Performance of Political Leaders ($\beta=.292$; $t=8.596$; $p=.000$) and Government’s Responsiveness ($\beta=.115$; $t=3.415$; $p<.05$) are both highly significant predictors of trust in political institutions. This model thus confirms that political performance matters, but only in so far as that it is the leaders who are performing and that they are willing to listen to citizens. Whether or not the democratic regime performs is insignificant.

The model presented above confirms that individual circumstances and values do play a role in shaping and influencing political trust. But it shows that not all individual circumstances are equally important. For example, whether someone lives in an urban or rural area, or whether someone is male or female, or is poor or rich, believes most people can be trusted or not; or has high or low levels of education, have no significant impact on their perceptions of whether political institutions can be trusted or not. These are all insignificant predictors of political trust.

On the other hand, belonging to the largest ethnic group ($\beta=.144$; $t=4.032$; $p<.000$), living within the former war zone ($\beta=.103$; $t=2.586$; $p<.05$) and being older ($\beta=.074$; $t=2.269$; $p<.05$) do contribute significantly to positive perceptions of trust. Given the country’s colonial history and the deliberate strategies of ‘exclusive nationalism’ and the ‘patriotic history’ to keep milking the liberation war for political benefits, it is not surprising that the ruling party’s loyal support-base are drawing on their past experiences when expressing trust in political institutions. It is likely that these cultural manifestations of trust will continue for some time to come. This model confirms that right now, there are still political benefits for institutions imbedded within Namibians’ experiences with the liberation war. It thus confirms that cultural influences do still have a significant effect on how Namibians trust their institutions.

Perhaps the most surprising finding is that Namibians’ perceptions on the Government’s performance regarding delivery of basic services has no significant bearing on how much they trust or distrust political institutions. This finds no significant support for Mishler and Rose’s (2001) assertion that citizen’s trust in government is influenced by whether they have a positive or negative experiences and that negative experiences would have a much stronger impact on trust in government than a positive one. In Namibia, this has no significant bearing on levels of trust. When seen in the light of the very modest significant impact of perceptions of Government’s Economic Policy Performance, one can conclude that economic performance at the policy and at the delivery level, have very little impact on political trust. This model as presented here finds no support for the hypothesis that the delivery of basic services will have a significant influence on how much citizens will trust or distrust their institutions.

Lastly, the model presented here shows that public perceptions on whether corruption is increasing, or decreasing, do have a significant impact on citizen’s levels of trust in political institutions ($\beta=.123$; $t=3.771$; $p=.000$). In the confines of our model, it is highly significant, second only to Leadership Performance among the institutional predictors of political trust.

7. Conclusions

Our model of political trust in Namibia is typical of what Mishler and Rose (1997) call a lifetime learning model of trust. “According to a lifetime learning model, interpersonal trust may develop initially as a result of youthful, pre-political experiences and subsequently may be projected onto institutions in the manner predicted by cultural theory. These initial predispositions to trust or distrust institutions, however, may be subsequently reinforced or revised depending on the extent to which initial lessons are challenged or confirmed by later-life experiences, including adult evaluations of political performance.”

This means that the analytical value of models of trust such as the one presented here may change over time – either because any single or combination of predicting variables within either the culture cluster of variables or the institution cluster of variables (or both) – and become more or less significant (in the context of the model) for our understanding of political trust. If the predictions in the literature are correct, performance variables, and especially variables dealing with various aspects of economic performance may grow in importance as Namibia’s democracy gets older and the impact of the liberation war lessens as the older generations become less politically important. Changes due to modernisation

may alter existing social structures which will have an impact on their influence on political trust.

For now, trust in Namibia's political institutions is still shaped in a significant manner by experiences with the liberation war. There is also an ethnic element to how Namibians trust their political institutions. Older Namibians display higher levels of trust, but only modestly so. It appears that economic influences – both the policy and service delivery component thereof – has much less impact on political trust than political influences. This may suggest that there is still a very personal element to political trust; and as such Leaders' Performance has a significant impact on trust but not Basic Services Delivery Performance. This may also explain why the cultural influences are so influential.

It remains to be seen whether untrustworthy institutions will indeed generate scepticism and distrust; or whether they will be 'forgiven' as part of the 'patriotic history' project that is still prominent. It will also have to be seen "that if socialisation and performance influences conflict, more proximate performance evaluations will override the earlier influence exerted by cultural norms and socialisation experiences" as is predicted by Mishler and Rose (1997). Right now, there is little evidence thereof; the cultural influences of the liberation war, exceed the importance of economic performance in shaping trust, quite comfortably.

Whereas governments should be aware that while trust takes time to be established, it can be lost quickly, the Namibian government is likely to keep banking on the trust of citizens drawing on the past, the liberation war, rather than those who value its performance; it is both easier and less costly. Although they a very forgiving support base, there is one element that could bring about a trust crisis even for these Namibians. Corruption is seen as a problem by all as is reflected by the growing perceptions that corruption increases year after year. It continues to plague the current political leadership as was seen during the most recent #fishrot scandal. If not addressed, it has the potential to undo at least some of good that has been done thus far.

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Afrobarometer Round 8 - Namibia 2019

Summary of results relating to political trust - Institutions and leaders

How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say:
The president?

	Urban	Rural	Male	Female	Total
Not at all	17.5	11.9	13.9	16.3	15.1
Just a little	27.7	22.4	25.6	25.2	25.4
Somewhat	31.4	29.0	31.0	29.6	30.3
A lot	19.1	29.4	24.2	23.0	23.6
Refused	0.1	0.5	0.2	0.4	0.3
Don't know	4.1	6.8	5.1	5.5	5.3

Q41A1_NAM. How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: The prime minister?

	Urban	Rural	Male	Female	Total
Not at all	14.5	13.4	14.2	13.8	14.0
Just a little	27.9	19.0	24.2	23.8	24.0
Somewhat	29.8	25.7	29.5	26.6	28.0
A lot	25.3	39.8	30.3	33.0	31.6
Refused	0.1	0.5	0.2	0.4	0.3
Don't know	2.4	1.6	1.7	2.4	2.0

Q41B. How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: The National Assembly?

	Urban	Rural	Male	Female	Total
Not at all	22.2	17.4	19.6	20.5	20.5
Just a little	28.1	23.4	26.8	25.3	26.1
Somewhat	32.1	28.0	30.3	30.4	30.3
A lot	11.0	19.2	15.0	14.2	14.6
Refused	0.1	0.5	0.2	0.4	0.3
Don't know	6.5	11.4	8.1	9.2	8.7

Q41B1_NAM. How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: The National Council?

	Urban	Rural	Male	Female	Total
Not at all	22.4	18.5	19.9	21.5	20.7
Just a little	29.8	25.7	29.5	26.6	28.0
Somewhat	32.3	27.5	29.3	31.1	30.2
A lot	11.3	17.5	14.6	13.4	14.0
Refused	0.1	0.5	0.2	0.4	0.3
Don't know	6.9	11.9	9.1	9.0	9.1

Q41C. How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Electoral Commission of Namibia or ECN?

	Urban	Rural	Male	Female	Total
Not at all	18.1	10.4	14.9	14.6	14.8
Just a little	25.3	23.2	22.8	26.0	24.4
Somewhat	36.2	31.8	34.9	33.7	34.3
A lot	16.3	27.6	22.1	20.3	21.2
Refused	0.1	0.5	0.2	0.4	0.3
Don't know	3.9	6.6	5.1	5.0	5.1

Q41D. How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Your local authority council?

	Urban	Rural	Male	Female	Total
Not at all	20.6	18.1	18.4	20.7	19.5
Just a little	29.8	25.5	26.1	29.7	27.9
Somewhat	34.2	27.8	32.4	30.4	31.4
A lot	11.5	16.8	15.7	11.9	13.8
Refused	0.1	0.5	0.2	0.4	0.3
Don't know	3.8	11.4	7.3	7.0	7.1

Q41D1_NAM. How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Your regional council?

	Urban	Rural	Male	Female	Total
Not at all	22.2	15.1	17.9	20.4	19.1
Just a little	30.0	26.7	27.0	30.2	28.6
Somewhat	34.1	30.5	34.3	30.7	32.5
A lot	11.1	21.9	17.3	14.3	15.8
Refused	0.1	0.5	0.2	0.4	0.3
Don't know	2.4	5.4	3.4	4.0	3.7

Q41D2_NAM. How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Your appointed regional governor?

	Urban	Rural	Male	Female	Total
Not at all	22.7	16.4	19.2	20.7	20.0
Just a little	29.6	26.3	26.8	29.6	28.2
Somewhat	32.0	26.5	31.5	27.8	29.6
A lot	10.1	21.2	15.5	14.5	15.0
Refused	0.2	0.5	0.2	0.4	0.3
Don't know	5.3	9.1	6.9	7.0	6.9

Q41E. How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: The ruling party?

	Urban	Rural	Male	Female	Total
Not at all	22.6	14.5	18.4	19.7	19.0
Just a little	23.1	20.5	20.3	23.7	22.0
Somewhat	35.5	25.1	31.5	30.4	31.0
A lot	17.2	36.6	27.1	24.1	25.6
Refused	0.4	0.8	0.6	0.4	0.5
Don't know	1.3	2.5	2.0	1.6	1.8

Q41F. How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Opposition political parties?

	Urban	Rural	Male	Female	Total
Not at all	24.9	30.0	25.1	29.2	27.1
Just a little	30.8	30.7	30.3	31.2	30.8
Somewhat	30.8	23.7	27.2	23.7	25.4
A lot	30.8	11.2	13.2	11.2	12.2
Refused	0.4	0.9	0.4	0.7	0.6
Don't know	4.1	3.6	3.8	4.0	3.9

Q41G. How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: The police?

	Urban	Rural	Male	Female	Total
Not at all	17.2	6.7	11.7	13.6	12.6
Just a little	25.7	26.5	25.4	26.7	26.1
Somewhat	33.3	29.1	32.4	30.5	31.5
A lot	23.0	35.3	29.3	27.4	28.3
Refused	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.2
Don't know	0.6	2.1	1.0	1.5	1.3

Q41H. How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: The Namibian Defence Force?

	Urban	Rural	Male	Female	Total
Not at all	15.3	7.4	10.6	13.2	11.9
Just a little	23.9	24.5	23.7	24.7	24.2
Somewhat	33.1	28.0	31.8	30.0	30.9
A lot	25.7	36.6	31.7	29.3	30.5
Refused	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.2
Don't know	1.8	3.1	2.2	2.6	2.4

Q41I. How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Courts of law?

	Urban	Rural	Male	Female	Total
Not at all	13.2	9.5	10.9	13.2	11.9
Just a little	30.3	25.4	27.0	29.4	28.2
Somewhat	33.9	31.2	32.8	32.7	32.8
A lot	17.4	26.5	23.9	18.9	21.4
Refused	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.2
Don't know	5.0	7.1	5.3	6.4	5.9

Q41J. How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: The Ministry of Finance, Inland Revenue?

	Urban	Rural	Male	Female	Total
Not at all	18.1	10.2	13.3	16.0	14.7
Just a little	33.6	27.9	30.3	31.9	33.1
Somewhat	33.5	30.0	32.7	31.2	31.9
A lot	8.8	20.6	16.7	11.2	13.9
Refused	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.2
Don't know	5.9	11.0	6.8	9.4	8.1

Q41K. How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Traditional leaders?

	Urban	Rural	Male	Female	Total
Not at all	15.4	7.7	11.4	12.7	12.1
Just a little	22.6	20.7	20.2	23.3	21.8
Somewhat	32.5	30.4	32.8	30.3	31.6
A lot	22.2	39.0	30.2	28.8	29.5
Refused	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.3
Don't know	7.0	1.8	5.2	4.4	4.8

Q41L. How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Religious leaders?

	Urban	Rural	Male	Female	Total
Not at all	13.6	7.9	11.7	10.5	11.0
Just a little	23.0	20.5	21.5	22.2	21.9
Somewhat	30.7	26.6	29.8	28.0	28.9
A lot	30.4	42.0	34.3	36.6	35.4
Refused	0.1	0.6	0.2	0.5	0.3
Don't know	2.2	2.5	2.5	2.2	2.3

Q51A. Do you approve or disapprove of the way that the following people have performed their jobs over the past 12 months, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: President Hage Geingob?

	Urban	Rural	Male	Female	Total
Not at all	8.2	11.6	10.9	8.4	9.7
Just a little	29.4	20.4	25.9	25.0	25.5
Somewhat	45.2	48.2	44.5	48.6	46.5
A lot	14.3	16.9	15.7	15.2	15.4
Refused	0.1		0.1		0.1
Don't know	2.7	2.9	2.8	2.8	2.8

Q51A1_NAM. Do you approve or disapprove of the way that the following people have performed their jobs over the past 12 months, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Prime Minister Saara Kuugongelwa?

	Urban	Rural	Male	Female	Total
Not at all	6.6	8.4	7.3	7.5	7.4
Just a little	31.4	23.1	28.5	27.1	27.8
Somewhat	44.6	45.4	43.8	46.1	44.9
A lot	9.9	13.5	12.3	10.6	11.5
Refused	7.5	9.6	8.1	8.7	8.4
Don't know	6.6	8.4	7.3	7.5	7.4

Q51B1_NAM. Do you approve or disapprove of the way that the following people have performed their jobs over the past 12 months, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Members of the National Assembly?

	Urban	Rural	Male	Female	Total
Not at all	6.1	7.2	6.3	6.8	6.6
Just a little	37.1	28.8	33.4	33.6	33.5
Somewhat	37.7	41.0	40.0	38.4	39.2
A lot	6.4	7.8	7.1	6.9	7.0
Refused		0.2		0.2	0.1
Don't know	12.7	15.0	13.2	14.2	13.7

Q51B2_NAM. Do you approve or disapprove of the way that the following people have performed their jobs over the past 12 months, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Your National Council representative?

	Urban	Rural	Male	Female	Total
Not at all	4.6	9.0	7.0	6.1	6.5
Just a little	36.8	27.2	31.8	33.4	32.6
Somewhat	39.0	37.9	39.7	38.3	38.5
A lot	5.7	8.9	7.4	6.8	7.1
Refused		0.1		0.1	0.1
Don't know	13.9	16.9	15.1	15.3	15.2

Q51B3_NAM. Do you approve or disapprove of the way that the following people have performed their jobs over the past 12 months, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Your elected regional councillor?

	Urban	Rural	Male	Female	Total
Not at all	7.3	10.1	7.7	9.3	8.5
Just a little	35.3	29.5	31.4	34.1	32.7
Somewhat	44.8	42.7	46.3	41.6	43.9
A lot	5.4	9.5	6.9	7.4	7.2
Refused	7.3	8.1	7.7	7.6	7.7
Don't know	7.3	10.1	7.7	9.3	8.5

Q51C. Do you approve or disapprove of the way that the following people have performed their jobs over the past 12 months, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Your elected local authority councillor?

	Urban	Rural	Male	Female	Total
Not at all	8.9	9.9	9.4	9.2	9.3
Just a little	39.4	24.1	30.8	34.7	32.0
Somewhat	38.4	39.5	39.6	38.1	38.9
A lot	4.3	7.2	6.4	4.8	5.6
Refused	0.0		0.0		0.0
Don't know	9.0	19.3	13.8	13.2	13.5

Q51C1_NAM. Do you approve or disapprove of the way that the following people have performed their jobs over the past 12 months, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Your appointed regional governor?

	Urban	Rural	Male	Female	Total
Not at all	5.6	6.9	6.2	6.1	6.2
Just a little	39.9	28.0	33.4	36.0	34.7
Somewhat	37.1	41.2	41.2	36.5	38.9
A lot	7.2	12.3	8.0	10.9	9.4
Refused	0.1	1.0	0.6	0.4	0.5
Don't know	10.1	10.8	10.6	10.1	10.4

Q51D. Do you approve or disapprove of the way that the following people have performed their jobs over the past 12 months, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Your traditional leader?

	Urban	Rural	Male	Female	Total
Not at all	5.7	7.4	14.2	13.8	14.0
Just a little	28.5	19.4	24.2	23.8	24.0
Somewhat	37.5	50.7	44.8	41.7	43.3
A lot	6.5	15.7	9.5	11.5	10.5
Not applicable	8.0	1.9	4.5	6.1	5.3
Refused	0.0			0.1	0.0
Don't know	13.8	4.9	10.4	9.5	9.9

Q38A. How much of the time do you think the following try their best to listen to what people like you have to say: Members of the National Assembly?

	Urban	Rural	Male	Female	Total
Not at all	49.0	59.0	52.1	54.7	53.4
Just a little	33.7	22.9	29.1	28.9	29.0
Somewhat	8.1	5.8	9.4	4.8	7.1
A lot	4.2	3.8	3.8	4.3	4.0
Refused		0.2		0.2	0.1
Don't know	5.0	8.3	5.7	7.2	6.4

Q38A1_NAM. How much of the time do you think the following try their best to listen to what people like you have to say: Representatives to the National Council?

	Urban	Rural	Male	Female	Total
Not at all	46.0	59.3	49.7	53.9	51.8
Just a little	33.2	22.9	30.7	26.8	28.7
Somewhat	9.9	6.3	8.7	7.9	8.3
A lot	5.1	3.3	4.5	4.2	4.3
Refused		0.2		0.2	0.1
Don't know	5.7	8.1	6.4	7.1	6.7

Q38B. How much of the time do you think the following try their best to listen to what people like you have to say: Local authority councillors?

	Urban	Rural	Male	Female	Total
Not at all	41.5	50.3	44.5	46.2	45.3
Just a little	36.1	26.3	31.8	31.7	31.8
Somewhat	13.1	11.1	14.4	10.1	12.2
A lot	6.4	3.9	4.9	5.8	5.3
Refused	0.2	0.2		0.4	0.2
Don't know	2.7	8.2	4.4	5.8	5.1

Q38B1_NAM. How much of the time do you think the following try their best to listen to what people like you have to say: Regional councillors?

	Urban	Rural	Male	Female	Total
Not at all	41.2	48.1	42.1	46.4	44.2
Just a little	36.3	25.8	31.6	31.8	31.7
Somewhat	11.6	14.2	15.4	10.0	12.7
A lot	7.5	6.3	7.4	6.6	7.0
Refused		0.2		0.2	0.1
Don't know	3.4	5.4	3.5	5.0	4.2

Q38C. How much of the time do you think the following try their best to listen to what people like you have to say: Traditional leaders?

	Urban	Rural	Male	Female	Total
Not at all	35.0	32.5	33.2	34.7	34.0
Just a little	30.4	24.7	25.9	30.0	27.9
Somewhat	12.7	22.3	18.9	14.8	16.9
A lot	11.6	16.6	14.9	12.7	13.8
Refused		0.2		0.2	0.1
Don't know	10.2	3.7	7.2	7.6	7.4

Appendix 1

Figure 2: Factor loadings Economic Policy Performance

Pattern Matrix ^a		
	Factor	
	1	2
Handling maintaining roads and bridges	.770	
Handling providing water and sanitation services	.749	
Handling improving basic health services	.727	
Handling providing a reliable supply of electricity	.712	
Handling addressing educational needs	.666	
Handling improving living standards of the poor		.803
Handling managing the economy		.802
Handling creating jobs		.684
Handling narrowing gaps between rich and poor		.665
Handling keeping prices stable		.531
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.		
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.		
a. Rotation converged in 7 iterations.		

Figure 2 contains the findings of the findings of the Factor Analysis containing 10 performance areas. The original two-factor model explains 53.7% of variance. The first factor – Basic Service Provision Performance – explains 44.6% whilst the second factor – Economic Policy Performance – explains about 9%. The 5 items that made up the first factor were subjected to Reliability Analysis and were found to constitute a single significant scale ($\alpha=.856$). The scale was computed by adding the values of each individual item and dividing the sum by the number of items to obtain an average. The same methodology was followed to compute the Economic Policy Performance index. Reliability Analysis showed it comprised a single reliable scale ($\alpha=.837$).

Appendix 2

Figure 3: Factor loading Political Leaders Performance

Factor Matrix ^a	
	Factor
	1
Regional Councillor	.813
National Council Representative	.808
Members of the National Assembly	.779
Regional Governor	.758
Local government councillor	.757
Prime Minister	.699
President	.606
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.	
a. 1 factors extracted. 4 iterations required.	

Figure 3 contains the findings of the Factor Analysis. It shows the loadings for 7 political leaders' perceived performance. This single factor model explains 56.1% of variance. The 7 items that made up the factor were subjected to Reliability Analysis and were found to constitute a single significant scale ($\alpha=.896$). The scale was computed by adding the values of each individual item and dividing the sum by the number of items to obtain an average.

Appendix 3

Figure 4: Factor loadings Government's responsiveness

Factor Matrix ^a	
	Factor
	1
National Council Representatives	.931
Members of the National Assembly	.895
Regional councillors	.638
Local government councillors	.606
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.	
a. 1 factors extracted. 5 iterations required.	

Figure 4 contains the findings of the Factor Analysis' it shows the factor loadings for 4 items tapping into citizens' perceptions on Government's responsiveness. This single-factor model explains 61% of variance. The items were subjected to Reliability Analysis and were found to constitute a single significant scale ($\alpha=.832$). The scale was computed by adding the values of each individual item and dividing the sum by the number of items to obtain an average.

APPENDIX 4

Figure 5: Factor loadings trust in Government

Pattern Matrix ^a		
	Factor	
	1	2
National Council	.978	
Local Council	.911	
National Assembly	.876	
Regional Councillor	.865	
Regional Governor	.842	
Prime Minister	.679	
President	.614	
Electoral Commission of Namibia	.600	
Ruling Party	.512	.321
Police		.897
Namibia Defence Force		.835
Courts of Law		.454
Ministry of Finance, Dept. Inland Revenue	.368	.439
Opposition parties		
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.		
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.		
a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations.		

Figure 5 contains the findings of the Factor Analysis containing all 15 institutions. The original two factor model explains 61.7% of variance. The first factor – Trust in Government – explains 56.6% whilst the second factor – Trust in the State – explains just about 5%. It is also clear that Namibians were unsure where to place opposition parties. The fact that have loadings $<.30$ suggests that they were not seen as part of the Government or the State. That item was thus dropped from the analysis. The first 9 items that loaded on the first factor were subjected to Reliability Analysis and were found to constitute a single significant scale ($\alpha=.943$).

About the Author

Christiaan Keulder is a well-known Namibian political scientist who was a founding Executive Director of the IPPR from 2001 to 2005. He holds an MA in Political Science from the University of Stellenbosch. He is the national investigator for the Afrobarometer survey in Namibia.

About Democracy Report

Democracy Report is a project of the IPPR which analyses and disseminates information relating to the legislative agenda of Namibia's Parliament. The project aims to promote public participation in debates concerning the work of Parliament by publishing regular analyses of legislation and other issues before the National Assembly and the National Council. Democracy Report is funded by the Embassy of Finland.

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The Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) is a not-for-profit organisation with a mission to deliver independent, analytical, critical yet constructive research on social, political and economic issues that affect development in Namibia. The IPPR was established in the belief that development is best promoted through free and critical debate informed by quality research.



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